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Executive Summary
Over the next few decades, the global food system will
come under renewed pressure from the combined effects
of seven fundamental factors: population growth, the
nutrition transition, energy, land, water, labour and
climate change. The combined effects will create
constraints on food supply and if action is not taken, there
is a real potential for demand growth to outstrip increases
in global food production. Effects on developing countries
would be devastating. Developed countries will be affected
too. Expectations of abundant and ever cheaper food could
come under strain. The UK can no longer afford to take its
food supply for granted.
Some of the effects of change are already being felt.
Global food prices are subject to increasing volatility, and
are provoking defensive trade and political responses that
disrupt normal market behaviour. World trade structures
could come under increased pressure as continued access
to scarce resources becomes a strategic concern for many
countries. The UK is not immune to such activities, being
dependent on a small number of critical sources and
inputs from the world market – soya-based animal feed
and phosphate fertilizers among them. A food crisis in the
UK is not unthinkable. And, added to all these factors, the
environmental impacts of modern agriculture and of the
broader overall food chain can no longer be ignored.
The recent price spike has served to underline our
global interdependency and demonstrated the political
and social importance of affordable food. Despite today’s
deflationary pressures, the underlying upward pressure on
EU/UK prices is likely to be maintained, particularly as the
need to incorporate the true cost of resources into our food
supply becomes more pressing. And as the wider impacts
of food production and consumption on the nation’s social
and economic wellbeing become more starkly obvious, the
food system will need to reflect society’s choices as much
as individual consumer preferences.
In this environment, ‘business as usual’ models could at
worst fail, and at best be poor preparation for the coming
period. EU/UK food supply arrangements will be required
to operate profitably around a significantly higher price
norm, one that reflects the true cost of resources and
incorporates wider social and ecological considerations. A
system that is able to reconcile the often conflicting goals
of resilience, sustainability and competitiveness and that is
able to meet and manage consumer expectations will
become the new imperative.
New capabilities, policy frameworks and institutions
will become the cornerstones of the new system. Domestic
production will continue to play a significant role in the
UK food’s supply. But it will need to adapt to become both
productive and sustainable; technological innovation and
transfer of best practice will be key. Collaborative relation-
ships around the supply network will take on a new impor-
tance and become part of the drive for a more integrated
approach. Retailers in particular will need to adapt their
practices to alter the balance of risk and reward
throughout the chain. But it is currently unclear whether
the sectors can easily reconcile traditional commercial
imperatives with the wider public interest and move from
its ingrained short-termism in order to develop the more
strategic focus required. For the consumer, new uncertain-
ties over the affordability of food, along with continuing
environmental and health concerns, will mean changes in
consumption patterns.
www.chathamhouse.org.uk
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Action to address the more worrying trends and their
effects on the UK needs to be put in hand now. The tran-
sition will be tough; finding the right way through will
become a significant determinant of national economic
wellbeing. In the UK itself, national and devolved govern-
ments must recognize their role as incubators of innova-
tion and drivers of transformation.
A detailed strategic vision of the new system, one that
will avoid the worst effects of change and starts to capi-
talize instead on newly created opportunities, has to be the
way forward. The establishment of a consortium of
government, supply network interests and societal groups
(media, NGOs, universities) would be a good first step to
facilitate the building of this vision. The partnership would
need to undertake a proactive review of current arrange-
ments in meeting policy objectives, delivering specifically:
 a detailed picture of the new food systems needed;
 a set of indicators and metrics;
 a statement of UK’s strategic and geo-political interests.
It will also be important to establish a clearer description of
a sustainable diet and to develop communication and
education strategies to engage the public on key food issues.
Increased investment in public agriculture and food
research will be needed, along with support for private-
public partnership frameworks to deliver technology
transfer, particularly across agriculture. The UK will
continue to rely heavily on the EU for its food supplies and
as a market for its food exports. Many of the mechanisms to
deliver the transformation lie at this level. UK isolation is
not an option and the UK will need to work closely with the
EU to develop the right policy frameworks.
www.chathamhouse.org.uk
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1. Introduction
Corporate decision-makers, government policy-makers
and consumers are facing a future beset by uncertainties of
resource supply and distribution. New questions are
arising about the availability, accessibility and affordability
of food, land, water, energy and skills – and increasingly
around the adaptability of the systems needed to deliver
them. ‘UK Food Supply in the 21st Century: The New
Dynamic’ is a two-year research project that has been
considering these issues. The activities supporting this
project have provided a rare opportunity for stakeholders
across the UK’s wheat and dairy industries to examine the
issues collectively. They have been supported by a research
team drawn from centres of excellence around the UK and
by a process that has ensured the gathering of opinion
from around the supply networks concerned and from
around the country, including the perspectives of stake-
holders in Wales and Scotland. This is its final report.
As the UK’s food supply adjusts to increasing market
change, it is vital that stakeholder organizations develop a
corresponding capacity to plan for these eventualities.
Focusing on the supply of wheat and dairy products to the
UK market, the project examined the combined effects of
the global elements in play. It considered in particular the
significance of individual positions taken by stakeholder
sectors and organizations, and the possible economic and
other breaking points of the supply networks as they are
currently operated.
The project began by considering the factors involved in
the global contexts, which were used to construct four
global medium-term scenarios of food supply. The
reactions to the scenarios of stakeholders in the wheat and
dairy supply networks were then examined to develop an
understanding of the implications of change both by sector
and in wider systems terms. The report highlights the
likely limitations of current policy frameworks and gover-
nance models in the light of the potential changes it iden-
tifies. In its conclusions and recommendations, the
research team assesses the nature of food demand and
supply in the future, and the options open to stakeholders
across the supply network, some of which provide a basis
for further study.
www.chathamhouse.org.uk
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2. The Global Context
What we had thought of as abundant food supply is anything
but. Western societies, in particular, have tended to take their
food supply for granted. The global system as currently
operated will reach breaking point unless action is taken.
Since 2006 at least, food supply (and ‘the food crisis’, as
it has become known) has become a serious concern for
politicians, commentators and the public, particularly the
poor in developed and developing countries around the
world. The final year of the project’s research took place
against an unexpected and extraordinary increase in the
world prices of many food commodities. At the time of
writing, food prices have fallen from their early/mid-2008
peaks but remain at levels higher than their long-term
trends. Their volatility reflects continued uncertainty
about market fundamentals and their combined effects.1
In its report Global Commodities the UK Treasury charts
developments from early 20062 when the FAO Food Price
Index (FFPI) started to rise steadily, reaching a record 219
points in June 2008.3 The upward trend in the index was
fuelled by the volatile but overall hugely inflated prices of a
range of key commodities including cereals, dairy products
and oils and fats. As Figure 1 shows, between August 2005
and August 2008 the price of US hard wheat rose by 120%,
US maize by 138% and US soybeans by 128%.
Similarly, between August 2005 and August 2008, the
price of whole milk powder rose by 69% and the price of
butter by 74%; the price of some meat products also
increased: 10% for beef and 62% for chicken meat between
June 2005 and June 2008 (Figure 2).
The increases in agricultural commodity prices
contributed to a worldwide increase in consumer food
prices. In the UK, food price inflation peaked at 12.8% in
August 2008.4 A British family that spent £100 a week on
food in 2007 had to spend £634 more during 2008 to
consume the same basket of goods. Other developed
nations also experienced food price inflation in 2008,
although it was lower than in the UK: by mid-2008, it had
reached 6.7% in France, 7.4% in Germany and 7.1% in the
United States.5 For low-income countries, particularly those
that import the bulk of their food, the effects of price
increases have been more severe. In many cases their access
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Figure 1: Price of wheat, soybeans and maize, 1998–2008
Source: FAO International Commodity Prices Database (15 September 2008), http://www.fao.org/es/esc/prices/PricesServlet.jsp?lang=en.
to imports has been affected by trade restrictions imposed
by other countries responding to high prices. The United
Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
estimates that 50 million people joined the ranks of the
world’s hungry in 2007;6 that is not so surprising in circum-
stances where up to 70% of income (as opposed to 10% in
high-income countries) is likely to be spent on food.7 Aiding
themost vulnerable also becamemore expensive; the cost of
the UN’s World Food Programme’s operations increased by
more than 50% between 2002 and 2007, and in 2007 world
food aid flows fell to their lowest level since 1973.8
Food prices increased despite record harvests of staple
crops over recent years. Between 2000 and 2008 the average
global wheat harvest was 340 million tonnes higher than
during the 1990s. Over the same period the average yearly
corn harvest rose by 136 million tonnes and the soybean
harvest by 76 million tonnes.9 This anomaly can be partly
explained by a number of shorter-term factors, as listed below.
 Low global stock levels.World food stocks are histor-
ically low (Figure 3). The FAO estimated that in
2007/08 the ratio of world total cereal ending-stocks
to predicted world cereal usage would fall to 18.8%,
the lowest in three decades.10
At the close of the 2007/08 season total grain
(wheat and coarse grain) stocks were estimated to be
285 million tonnes, just 5% up on the previous year
after a 43% drop over 2006/07. Stocks are forecast to
rise in 2008/09 by 16% (301 million tonnes) as the
market responds to higher prices with greater
plantings. This would still leave stock levels lower
than in 2005/06 and 2004/0511 and is unlikely to
provide an effective defence against any disruptions
to supply and an associated rise in prices.
 Weather events and disease. The absence of large
buffer stocks exacerbated the effects on food prices of
episodes of adverse weather and outbreaks of animal
disease. During 2007 poor weather conditions
affected a number of grain-producing countries and
regions, reducing yields over large areas and
contributing to lower global average yields of grains
and oilseeds for the second consecutive year.12 In 2007
prices for pig, cattle and poultry meat were also
driven higher by reduced output as a result of
outbreaks of disease such as porcine reproductive and
respiratory syndrome virus (PRRSV) in China and es
foot-and-mouth and bluetongue in the EU.
 The activities of speculators. Factors such as the
weakness of the US dollar, low US interest rates and
greater portfolio diversification have encouraged
investors to pour billions of dollars into commodity
futures, particularly ‘soft’ commodities such as
www.chathamhouse.org.uk
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Food Futures
agricultural goods. The significance of such commodi-
ties speculation for price levels remains the subject of
much debate. The International Food Policy Research
Institute (IFPRI) believes that it has added to
commodity price volatility,13 while other commentators
have argued that it is unlikely to be a key cause of rising
prices.14 Speculation normally drives up commodity
prices by promoting hoarding; this would normally
cause the spot price to follow the futures price, but
throughout 2008 there was little evidence of this.15
Official data clearly show that stocks are falling.16 Even
commodities not included in the most popular index
(Standard & Poor’s Goldman Sachs Commodity Index
(S&PGSCI)) – tin, coal and iron ore – saw prices rise up
to mid-2008,17 a clear indication that changes in
demand and supply are still the significant determinants
of movement. IFPRI argues that the crucial question in
the ‘speculation debate’ is whether prices are any longer
a reliable indicator of the underlying demand and
supply fundamentals.18 If they are not, investors, policy-
makers and producers will not be acting on the right
signals, with potentially severe consequences for
farmers and consumers around the world.
 The actions of governments. Food price inflation and
the consequential bouts of social unrest seen across the
world19 have led governments, particularly in food-
importing countries, to introduce a variety ofmeasures
to limit or prevent domestic price increases. Inflation-
curbing behaviour has also occurred among food-
exporting countries, several of which have introduced
taxes or limits on exports. An extreme example of such
activity is Russia’s plan to form a state grain trading
company to control as much as half of the country’s
cereal exports.20 Restricting trade in this way will have
also contributed to price inflation in the short term
andmay send negative signals that lead to lower supply
levels and higher prices in the long term.
In addition to these shorter-term factors, many commenta-
tors argue that food prices have been affected by the devel-
opment of other, longer-term ones and that this is part of the
reason why, despite bumper crops, world food prices have
been so high and could continue to remain above the
longer-term trends (the FFPI in December 2008 was still
22% above average levels for 200621). In its November 2008
Food Outlook, the FAO argues that the gradual return to
equilibrium in food markets is not an indication that the
world’s food problems have been fixed.22 The report
concludes that although food prices will fall back from their
peaks, driven in part by the global economic downturn
acting to depress demand, they are likely to remain at higher
average levels over the medium term owing to constraints
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Figure 3: World corn, wheat, soybean and rice stocks, 1988–2008
Source: USDA PSD (19 August 2008), http://www.fas.usda.gov/psdonline/psdResult.aspx.
on the supply response, potentially exacerbated by low levels
of agricultural investment (because of low prices).23 The
downward trends in per capita (and even total) production
of many commodities are a particular source of concern,
affecting, as they do, not just grains but also fresh milk,
sugar, rice and beef.24 The view that longer-term factors are
in play is also echoed by a number of commentators:
according to Luis Cantarell, former head of Nestlé’s
European operations, ‘there has been a fundamental shift’
and the world ‘will not see over the next years commodity
prices return to previous levels of even two or three years
ago’.25 John Beddington, the Chief Scientific Adviser to the
UK Government, has concluded that ‘we are going to have
to expect to have – throughout the world and not just in the
UK – higher food prices’. He attributes the rise in prices
principally to the increase in world population and argues
that this will counter any significant reduction in prices that
may result from temporary falls in commodity prices.26
In this volatile price environment, evidence examined by
the research team suggests there are seven fundamental
pressures – two associated with demand and five with
supply-side factors – whose combined effects have the
potential to cause a tightening of overall capacity in food
markets. Left unaddressed, they threaten to lead to a signifi-
cant deterioration in the balance between the global demand
for food and the capacity of world agriculture to supply it.
The first fundamental is a rapidly rising world population.
Population expansion is a key driver of the long-term
increase in food demand (Figure 4) and although the total
rate of population growth is slowing down, it is estimated
that the world may need to feed over nine billion people by
2050. According to projections, over 95% of this growth
will occur in the developing world where, by 2050, 86% of
the world’s population will live.27
Already it seems that population growth is affecting
food availability (and arguably, therefore, food prices).
Annual global per capita grain production has declined,
falling from its peak of 342 kg in 1984 to 302 kg in 2006,
and total world grain production has fallen short of global
demand in seven of the last eight years.28
Many developing countries continue to struggle to meet
their populations’ demand for basic food. Others, particu-
larly those that have achieved high rates of economic
growth and have expanding urban populations, are seeing
rising incomes directed towards the purchase of a greater
quantity and variety of foodstuffs.
Rapid urbanization is also changing the shape of the
food system and patterns of demand. In 1961, one billion
of the world’s population lived in urban areas. The total
had reached three billion by 2003 and is projected to be
five billion by 2030. The scale of movement and the asso-
ciated change in consumption are unprecedented.
www.chathamhouse.org.uk
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The second fundamental is the effect of the ‘nutrition
transition’. The so-called nutrition transition is a feature of
countries’ development and the increasing affluence of their
populations. It involves a shift away from traditional staples
such as roots and tubers, and a corresponding increase in
the consumption of meat and dairy products (Figure 5),
refined and processed food, and sugars, oils and fats.
The trend is already well established, with the demand for
meat in developing countries doubling between 1986 and
2007. By 2007, Chinese annual average (per capita) meat
consumption had risen to 50 kg from a level of just 20 kg in
1985.29 China alone accounts for 57% of the rise in total meat
production in developing countries.30 As the trend continues,
China and other countries undergoing the nutrition transi-
tion such as India, Thailand and Egypt will require ever
greater amounts of animal feed, water and grazing land and
are likely to have to import some of their feed and livestock
products to meet future demand.31 This will tend to
strengthen the negative environmental impact associated
with the livestock sector. Rising demand as a result of the
nutrition transition may best be described as a long-term
underlying shift. It will continue to cause upward pressure on
world food and feed crop prices and is likely to be influenced
only marginally by global economic conditions.
As people consume a greater proportion of sugar,
meat, dairy products, oils and fats in their diet there is a
rise in diet-related chronic diseases such as heart
disease, cancer and diabetes. In the UK the cost to the
economy of these health problems is around £10 billion
per year, with £7.7 billion of that spent on National
Health Service treatment.32 The World Health
Organization argues that obesity has become a global
epidemic. More than one billion adults are overweight and
at least 300 million of them are clinically obese. In devel-
oping countries, the problem of obesity coexists with that
of under-nutrition.33
Waste is another characteristic of the transition to a
more affluent diet. By definition, it consumes available
resources to no good effect, adding to the upward pressure
on prices. In addition to on-farm spoilage and in-store
wastage, considerable quantities of food are wasted by
consumers. In the UK they throw away about a third of all
food purchased (some 6.7 million tonnes each year in
England and Wales, according to the Waste and Resources
Action Programme34) – more than half of which is edible.
In the US, where 27% of the food available for consumption
is wasted, the US Department of Agriculture estimates that
recovering just 5% of it could feed four million people a
day.35 Over-consumption and food waste are by no means
confined to developed nations. In Chinese culture, conspic-
uous food consumption is a marker of economic and
political success. The resulting excess creates significant
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Figure 5: World average consumption of animal products, 1961–2003
Source: GEO Data Portal, FAOSTAT (2004), http://faostat.fao.org.
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levels of waste; more than 1,000 tonnes a day is thrown out
by restaurants in Shanghai alone.36
The third fundamental is energy. The cost of energy and
the degree of energy dependency in modern food produc-
tion systems are significant determinants of food prices.
Although oil prices are volatile, the level has risen consid-
erably over the last decade and other energy input prices,
for electricity and gas in particular, have also increased
steeply. At the same time, energy policies are creating new
pressures to reduce energy consumption and increase effi-
ciency. For all these reasons, the energy input costs for
agriculture and food businesses are likely to remain high
and may well continue to rise sharply in the future. If
projections from the International Energy Agency and
others prove correct and oil prices do rebound once the
global economy recovers, corresponding effects must be
anticipated on food production.
There is ample evidence of the significant effects of energy
costs on industrial food production. Producing one tonne of
maize in the US requires 160 litres of oil, compared with just
4.8 litres in Mexico where farmers rely on more traditional
methods. In 2005, expenditure on energy accounted for as
much as 16% of total US agricultural production costs, one-
third for fuel, including electricity, and two-thirds indirectly
for the production of fertilizer and chemicals.37
Similarly, the price of natural gas, which tends to follow
the pattern of changes in the oil price, accounts for 75–90%
of fertilizer production costs. The World Bank warned in
2008 that high fertilizer costs, directly related to high
energy prices, could reduce agricultural production, espe-
cially in poorer countries, causing further shortages and
inflating food prices.38
Food prices are also linked to energy prices through freight
costs. It is estimated that 4% of US food costs are attributable
to transport expenses; aviation fuel alone represents about 7%
of a retail basket of high-value products in a UK super-
market.39 The Baltic Dry Index (the global benchmark for the
cost of shipping commodities) reached a record high in
October 2007 and remained at significant levels throughout
the first half of 2008.40While the global economic downturn
has since led to a collapse in rates,41 the potential for
movements in freight rates to cause changes to trade patterns
was noted by the FAO,which reported a ‘noticeable reduction
in the degree of world market integration’ throughout 2007.
Thismeant, in other words, that regional prices had fallen out
of line with world prices as countries switched to sourcing
commoditiesmore locally in order to reduce transport costs.42
Foodmarkets and energy markets have also becomemore
closely linked through the increasing diversion of food
commodities to the market for ‘first-generation’ bio-ethanol
and bio-diesel-based fuel (Figure 6).Most biofuel production
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is policy-driven, heavily subsidized by government and
protected by import restrictions.43OECDmember countries
spent US$15 billion on biofuels during 2007, and many
countries have set targets for their use. OnUK filling-station
forecourts, bio-ethanol or bio-diesel already accounts for
2.5% of fuel, and under current proposals the proportion is
set to increase to 5% by 2010.44 Proponents of biofuels cite
their benefits as reduced greenhouse gas emissions and fuel
costs, increased fuel security, the creation of (animal) feed-
quality by-products and higher incomes for farmers. But
opposition is growing. Reasons include the morality in a
hungry world of converting food into fuel, the risks to bio-
diversity, and doubts about the true ‘green dividend’ of this
generation of biofuel-based products. It is clear that the
performance and risk of different biofuels against these
concerns vary. The International Monetary Fund (IMF)
argues that while greenhouse gas emissions from Brazilian
sugarcane ethanol are 91% lower per kilometre than petrol,
the comparative environmental benefits of corn- andwheat-
based ethanol areminimal.45 Other studies on the net energy
return of biofuels have reached varying conclusions: a
USDA study reported a positive return,46whereas Pimentel
and Patzek calculated that the fossil fuels required for the
manufacture of bio-ethanol from maize used 29% more
energy than was produced.47
The impact of biofuel production on food prices is
difficult to measure. As yet, it represents a relatively small
proportion of the total global supply of grains and oilseeds,
the major crops affected being maize, rapeseed and
sugarcane. Current estimates of its impact on food prices
in 2007/08 range from as much as 70–75% to as little as
3%,48 depending on the methodology used. Second-gener-
ation biofuels will use non-food crops and utilize a greater
proportion of the plant. But a commercially viable product
is not expected to emerge in the near future. The barriers
to be overcome include the technological challenge of
converting cellulose molecules into fermentable sugars on
a large scale, and the high costs of production involved.49
If the effect of biofuel production on food prices is unclear,
its contribution to higher levels of global grain demand is a
little easier to track. Between 1990 and 2005 annual global
demand increased at a relatively stable 21 million tonnes per
year on average,50 driven principally by rising demand from
consumers and livestock. But between 2006 and 2007 the
quantity of grain diverted to industrial uses (principally
maize for bio-ethanol production) climbed from 54 million
to 81 million tonnes, causing the world’s annual demand for
grain to increase in turn by an extra 27 million tonnes.51 To
meet this demand, land was diverted from other crops and
existing grain stocks were depleted. Despite the recent re-
examination of biofuel policy in the EU (where a reduction
in subsidies, along with high vegetable oil prices, has
rendered many biodiesel plants unprofitable), the IMF
judgment is that, without a policy change, demand pressures
from US ethanol production will continue to divert
increasing quantities of grain from food and feed.52
The expansion of biofuel production is changing how
land is used. A World Bank study has estimated that the
area of US land planted with maize increased by 23% in
2007, resulting in a 16% decline in the area planted with
soybeans; that in turn contributed to a 75% rise in soybean
prices between April 2007 and April 2008.53 Over the same
period, the EU and other wheat-exporting countries
produced oilseeds for bio-diesel on land formerly planted
with wheat. Had that change not occurred, global wheat
stocks in 2007 would have been almost as high as in 2001,
rather than nearly 50% lower.54
The fourth fundamental is land. The world’s agricultural
land area increased gradually from 4.49 billion acres to
4.96 billion acres between 1965 and 2005 (a 10.4%
increase). Only 7.2% of this increase occurred between
‘Between 2006 and 2007 the
quantity of grain diverted to
industrial uses climbed from 54
million to 81 million tonnes,
causing the world’s annual demand
for grain to increase in turn by an
extra 27 million tonnes’
1995 and 2005.55 However, the rapid rise in global popula-
tion means that the area of cultivated agricultural land per
capita declined worldwide from 1.45 hectares in 1960 to
just 0.78 hectares in 2003.56 In Asia, levels have fallen by as
much as 40% and in Africa by over 50%.57
Data from the FAO Global AEZ (agro-ecological
zoning) project suggest that only 22.7% of the earth’s
available arable land, 10.1 billion hectares,58 is moder-
ately to very highly suitable for rain-fed agriculture.59
The greatest proportion of this remaining land is
thought to be in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa
(the Global AEZ project believes that rain-fed cultiva-
tion potential has already been exhausted in many parts
of Asia60). However, the bulk of the world’s most produc-
tive land is already being utilized and much of the
remaining land is of low quality, difficult to access as a
result of poor infrastructure, more costly to work and
less productive.
The extent and utility of marginal land only become
issues if people are forced to farm it, which may be the case
as the populations in developing countries continue to
grow. On current estimates, about 12% more land globally
could be brought into agricultural use;61 a proportion of
this is formerly cultivated land left fallow in recent years
owing to varying factors including low agricultural prices
and policy measures such as set-aside in the EU. But the
assimilation of some areas would be at the expense of
forest cover or areas of conservation, requiring some
difficult cost/benefit judgments.
Most analysts predict that the area of cropland in use
will expand only slightly in future decades. This will leave
the bulk of future increases in production to be derived
from greater output per hectare of land. Current measures
of that output, particularly for some cereals, indicate that
the growth of yield per hectare is slowing down (Figure 7).
The average world wheat yield per hectare during the
1970s was 33.4% greater than in the 1960s; but in the first
years of the 21st century it has been only 8.7% above that
of the 1990s.62 Corn and rice yields have followed the same
trend, lending weight to the view that large gains in output
per hectare are becoming more difficult to achieve. In
terms of natural resources, yield per hectare relies on
investment in good-quality soil, continued inputs of water,
adequate supplies of skilled labour, favourable climate
conditions and research and development. Current
research indicates that there is cause for concern about all
these factors.
Soils are being eroded or degraded in large tracts of the
world’s farmland (as a result of increased salinity, wind and
water erosion, the over-use of chemical inputs and indus-
trial pollution). A report from the International
Assessment of Agricultural Science and Technology
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Figure 7: World corn, rice and wheat yield, 1960–2007
Source: USDA PSD (19 August 2008), http://www.fas.usda.gov/psdonline/psdResult.aspx.
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confirms this as a key factor underlying a slowing in the
growth of yield levels.63 It is estimated that past soil erosion
may have depressed yields in Africa by between 2% and
40%, leading to a continent-wide fall of 8.2%.64 Similarly in
South Asia water erosion may have reduced harvests by 36
million tonnes of cereal equivalent every year, costing the
region US$5.4 billion in lost income.65 A study published
in the journal Science found that in the 1990s soil erosion
was already costing the US economy about $44bn a year.66
As populations increase and the land in production
reaches its limits, the politics of the issue will focus
increasingly on national ‘footprints’, each country’s use of
resources. A 2006 study identified levels of consumption
equivalent to a notional 5.4 hectares per person in the
UK.67 In China, each person’s footprint was less than a
tenth of this, 0.4 hectares/person.68 But total global agricul-
tural land availability per person had dropped significantly
by 2003 to 0.79 hectares per person (Figure 8). While trade
can offer a positive means of offsetting any national imbal-
ances in resources (i.e. lack of water), pursuing unequal
shares of globally traded products (and therefore
resources) by nation-states could be increasingly judged as
unsustainable, both environmentally and ethically.
China and other capital-rich countries, particularly in
the Middle East and North Africa, are now beginning to
look outside their borders for agricultural land in an effort
to ensure greater security of food supply. The head of the
FAO has warned that these moves risk the creation of a
‘neo-colonial’ food system. Sudan, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan
and Ukraine, among others, are offering hundreds of
thousands of hectares of agricultural land for investment.69
Such political moves may bring much-needed income but
they will also have implications for the trade in foodstuffs
and for international relations.
The fifth fundamental affecting food production is water.
Producing one kilo of grain-fed beef requires 15 cubic
metres of water; one kilo of cereals needs 0.4–3 cubic
metres.70 The magnitude of annual global trade in virtual
water (the water embedded in food or other goods) exceeds
800 billion cubic metres a year – a flow equivalent to 10 Nile
rivers.71 This may allow the more efficient use of a precious
commodity but the export of goods with high embedded
water may cause environmental or social damage in
countries and regions where water is already scarce. Water
resource problems are often a linked result of inefficient state
subsidies to agriculture or the under-pricing of irrigation
water. More positively, the transfer of water across borders
through the trade of commodities, particularly foodstuffs,
allows countries short of water to consume foodstuffs that
they could not produce themselves and to produce alterna-
tive goods which require lower inputs of water.
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Source: UNEP GEO Data Portal (January 2006), Original data FAOSTAT, http://geodata.grid.unep.ch and US Census Bureau, International Data Base,
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The global stresses on available water for human
consumption are increasing. Overall usage stands today at
54% of the world’s freshwater supply; if per capita
consumption rises across the globe at the rate seen within
developed countries, this could increase to 90% by 2025.72
Even though the bulk of global agricultural production is
rain-fed, it accounts for around 70% of the freshwater
abstracted for human use.73 That fact will grow in signifi-
cance. The use of water for the irrigation of agricultural
land has been a ‘core part of the strategy to feed a doubling
of the world’s population’.74 Not all this water is drawn from
sustainable sources. China currently mines around 40
billion tonnes of fossil water annually from the aquifer
beneath the Hai Basin. When the aquifer runs dry, the
grain harvest in the basin will drop by 40 million tonnes
(enough to feed 120 million people).75 Likewise, 15% of
India’s food supply is produced by mining groundwater.
Some 175 million Indians are fed with grain produced
with water from wells that will soon go dry.76 Many farmers
around the world are depending on water that is trucked
in; or they are abandoning irrigation as the cost of
pumping becomes prohibitive and returning to less
productive dry-land farming.77 Rainfall and river flow are
also sources of concern, as the section below explains.
The sixth fundamental, climate change, is already high on
the agenda. Climate change is considered to be ‘an
important additional stress’ on agricultural production
systems already affected by high demand and degrada-
tion.78 It is identified as a factor in disruptive weather
events that have caused widespread crop losses in recent
years.79 The number of natural disasters is increasing over
time, indicating that more extreme weather events are
occurring.80
Climate change is also blamed for contributing to the
more rapid spread of crop and animal disease and for
changes in temperature and precipitation. The FAO warns
that animal diseases are ‘advancing globally’ as a result of
the changing climate and factors including increased
transportation and urbanization, with the potential to
cause more frequent supply interruptions.81 Rising temper-
atures are affecting glaciers that feed some of the world’s
biggest rivers including the Yellow and the Ganges,82 with
potentially disastrous consequences for local irrigated crop
production. Water shortages are already affecting many
regions. The IPCC predicts that, by 2020, between 75
million and 250 million people are likely to be exposed to
increased water stress as a result of climate change.83 By
2050, according to UNESCO, that could increase from
between two billion people in 48 countries and seven
billion in 60 countries.84
For some regions, particularly those in temperate zones
(including the UK), rising temperatures and levels of CO2
may have some positive impacts on agriculture in the form
of longer growing seasons and carbon fertilization.85For the
world as a whole, agricultural GDP (output) is predicted to
decline by 16% by 2020 as a result of climate change; agri-
cultural output in developing countries is likely to be the
most severely affected andmay decline by as much as 20%.86
Falling yields as a result of climate change will have an infla-
tionary effect on food prices. According to one calculation,
temperature increases of more than 3ºC could cause prices
to increase by up to 40%.87
The Stern report on climate change found that non-CO2
emissions from global agriculture are responsible for 14% of
global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Of agriculture’s
emissions, 38% are attributable to fertilizers. Livestock is the
second greatest source, accounting for 31%.88 A 2006
European Union life-cycle assessment of consumer impacts
found food and drink (but particularly the meat, meat
products and dairy sectors) to be the most significant
sources of GHGs, accounting for 20–30% of various envi-
ronmental impacts of European consumption.89
The seventh fundamental is labour. As people move to
urban areas and consume a greater and more varied diet
they also become reliant on the correspondingly reduced
rural population to produce their food and other agricul-
tural commodities. In both developed and developing
countries, the pressure on the agricultural workforce is
increasing. The FAO records that although the agricultural
workforce as a whole is shrinking (as small farmers leave
the land), the number of waged agricultural workers is
rising in most regions as new jobs are created, usually in
export-orientated agriculture. Of the 1.1 billion agricul-
tural workers worldwide, 40% earn a wage and do not own
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agricultural land or machinery. In unstable and temporary
employment, they often earn wages well below those of
industrial workers, and millions live below the poverty
line, with poor working conditions and little or no social
or regulatory protection. The FAO warns that despite the
potential of this human capital, ‘agriculture cannot be
sustainable’ while such circumstances continue. In many
countries the agricultural workforce is being decimated by
AIDS. The FAO estimates that in the 25 African nations
worst affected, 7 million agricultural workers have died of
AIDS since 1985. The countries most affected could lose
up to 25% of their agricultural labour force in less than two
decades, with potentially catastrophic implications for
food production.90
In many developed nations, migrant labour is relied
upon to harvest seasonal crops such as fruit and vegeta-
bles. In the UK, US and elsewhere, the tensions between
the demand from agriculture for a low-wage labour force
and the tightening of overall immigration policy continue
to prompt debate.
www.chathamhouse.org.uk
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3. The Implications
for the UK/EU
These new pressures will affect developed countries too.
Plentiful, varied and ever cheaper food has been the norm
for most people in the UK for 60 years, but the future food
supply system will need to reflect society’s choices as much as
individual consumer preference.
A central component of the project’s methodology has
been the employment of scenarios to explore the implica-
tions for UK/EU food systems of a range of global circum-
stances. Developed from the baseline of the ‘seven funda-
mentals’ set out in Chapter 2, and by means explained in
full at Annex A, four scenarios were used in a series of
workshops to generate debate and subsequently test
UK/EU food systems’ responses to possible changes.
Intended to be illustrative as opposed to predictive, the
scenarios were drawn from observable trends in global
food demand and supply rather than econometric
models.91
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Figure 9: Outlines of the four scenarios
1. Just a Blip (5 years)
High food prices trigger a strong supply response
by farmers. The weather is favourable. Global
anxieties recede and the oil price falls. The reduced
oil price undercuts the incentive for biofuel produc-
tion, which drops, reducing the competition with
food supply and freeing up production capacity.
Food moves into overproduction and prices fall to
below the long-run trendline as financial specula-
tors change track.
 Economic climate: growth
 Indicative oil price: $65
 Food stocks: rebuilt
 Food prices: fall back
2. Flood Inflation (10 years)
Demand for food grows with population and slightly
outpaces supply, as Asian meat consumption grows
and weather losses mount. High energy prices
support the push for biofuels and raise fertilizer prices.
The push for increased supply encourages investment
in new production technology. Productivity improves
but input costs and food prices remain high. High food
prices fuel inflation and contribute to economic
recession woes.
 Economic climate: stagflation
 Indicative oil price: $90-100
 Food stocks: low
 Food prices: sustained rise
3. Into a New Era (10+ years)
Oil supply tightens as peak oil arrives. Climate change
is stark and weather-related crop losses mount.
International carbon pricing is agreed and environ-
mental regulations get tougher, restricting energy use
and synthetic inputs. Under these conditions, funda-
mental long-term supply constraints become
apparent. The problems of the existing agricultural
paradigm are accepted and production gradually
shifts to an eco-technological approach.
 Economic climate: recovery
 Indicative oil price: $150
 Food stocks: tight
 Food prices: high then falling
4. Food Crisis (5 years)
New diseases spread and water shortages bite.
Geopolitical disruptions drive energy prices to record
levels. Significant input cost pressure drives food
prices higher. Grains stocks are run down in an effort
to avoid high prices. Extreme weather events reduce
harvests well below expectations. Stocks are
exhausted, and prices skyrocket. Nations control
prices and ban exports. Civil disturbances and wars
spread. Serious famines occur in many poor regions.
 Economic climate: recession
 Indicative oil price: $200
 Food stocks: exhausted
 Food prices: very high
The workshop discussions around the scenarios were
structured to consider the effects of interactions at various
points throughout the supply networks, exploring:
 why the same issues may be judged differently from
different points in the network;
 the significance of the individual positions taken by
stakeholders;
 possible economic and other breaking points;
 possible responses to change and the effects they generate;
 the limitations of current models of governance
(regulation by public authorities, self-regulation by
companies and consumer self-protection).
Outcomes relating to the UK wheat and dairy industries
are summarized in Box 1. But workshop contributors then
extrapolated from discussions the implications for UK
food supply systems in general. These were further
developed by the project team in subsequent research and
analysis.
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Box 1: The four scenarios
Scenario 1: ‘Just a Blip’
High food prices prove to be a temporary blip and soon return to the
long-term trend-line. There is a possibility, however, that if food prices
fall back sharply, financial speculation in commodities will operate in
reverse and lead to exaggerated food price volatility.
Workshop participants considered this to be too complacent.
Though recognizing that prices may fall back in the shorter term
(albeit to a higher level than before), they concluded that
something more akin to structural change is occurring.a
Wheat
 If prices fall back, there will be little incentive for agricultural
investment, particularly in R&D or plant breeding, and there
will be limited effects on overall productivity.
 For industry, a blip will generate more risk-adverse strategies,
with actors hedging against further blips. Post-blip, strategies
will be directed towards maintaining margins. The further
migration of food processing to lower-cost sources of labour
will continue to feature.
 There will be minimum impact on the consumer.
 Government policy will continue to focus on environmental
and health concerns.
Dairy
 The main problems will be found on the other side of the blip. It
is possible that farmers’ differing responses will give the sector
enough robustness to weather a drop in price. But price falls
could equally cause a sharp increase in exits from the industry;
though herd sizes could increase to help compensate for this,
the result could be a significant decline in UK milk production.
 (Wales) Wales as a country has limited scope for alternative
enterprises, especially where smaller farms are concerned.
That lack of alternatives could slow any decline in production
as a response to market changes.
Scenario 2: ‘Food Inflation’
Food prices stay high for a protracted period. They contribute signifi-
cantly to inflation, but the economy adapts and the existing food
system copes. The scenario is plausible; indeed, contributors
commented that elements of the scenario are already observable.
But to be realized in full, it would require contributing factors to be
in a critical balance.
Wheat
 Higher input costs, especially fertilizer and fuel, could drive
some changes in agricultural practice. While this would have
a small beneficial knock-on effect on the environment, the
need to maintain margins will reinforce intensive production
methods.
 (Scotland) While the market for wheat is robust (as 60% is
used for whisky), the cost burden will be higher owing to longer
transport distances. Increase in plantings in response to higher
prices will be limited owing to constraints on suitable land.
 Multinationals will potentially wield even more power within
the food system. They have the flexibility to switch sourcing
and methods of production/processing to suit the market.
 Longer-term supply network relationships will gain in
importance as processors and retailers try to lock in prices
and protect supply sources.
 Higher prices may create the impetus for the removal of
single farm payments.
Dairy
 Rising input prices will increase the costs associated with
keeping herds. To counteract this, producers will look to more
industrialized, intensive methods of production.
 Pressures to source dairy commodity products from the
cheapest suppliers will intensify (those with a comparative
advantage found, for example, in Eastern Europe). This will
increase competition from EU accession countries and may
lead to higher levels of UK imports.
 Waste will become more of a concern and all sectors will
look to eliminate waste, if only as a mechanism to cut costs.
 As sustained price rises start to have a noticeable effect,
there will be greater acceptance among poorer consumers of
intensive production methods and less priority given to
animal welfare, environmental or ethical considerations.
 (Wales) Increased input costs will not have as much impact
owing to the prevalence of grass-based systems, creating
opportunities for increased production. However, transport
distances and land prices may act as barriers to expansion.
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Scenario 3: ‘Into a New Era’
Input prices initially stay high as per capita production falls steadily. In
response, the system of food production is required to shift dramati-
cally so that increased yields are delivered efficiently through ‘regen-
erative’ rather than purely ‘extractive’ uses of resources. Current
debate recognizes that high commodity prices may be due in part to
the possibility of long-run capacity constraints in resources across
the board. Whether sufficiently high yields can be achieved through
an alternative production paradigm is certainly controversial, particu-
larly as the whole concept runs counter to the existing approach of
industrialized agriculture. But many observers maintain that a new
approach is feasible and that numerous pockets of innovation are
already pushing in this direction.
Wheat
 Significant investment in a diverse portfolio of technologies
will be required including crop breeding of UK-specific
varieties (genetically modified and conventional).
 More land in the UK will come under cultivation and the
demand for agricultural labour will grow. This may reverse
rural depopulation to some degree.
 Any moves towards more regionally or locally based
solutions pose difficulties for multinational companies. This
may create advantages for those organizations that already
operate on a more regional basis.
 Consumers may make purchasing decisions based more on the
true value of food. This could lead to lower consumption overall
and particularly of meat, livestock products and even wheat.
 The need to encourage change in agricultural practice may
increase calls to reinstate subsidies based on production.
Dairy
 Significant levels of technological innovation will be needed to
support a new production paradigm, particularly in methods to
control methane if the sector is to meet environmental standards.
 Innovation in product, process and packaging development
will be needed to meet these new standards. There may be
some conflict between the application of science and any
perceived decline in the ‘naturalness’ of products.
 While there are big opportunities for innovation in the dairy
sector, it is unclear whether the industry alone would be able
to generate the required funds. In particular, any reduction in
the consumption of milk products would create additional
barriers to investment.
 Demand from consumers for stricter environmental, ethical
and welfare regulation will be linked to demands for greater
transparency of products’ standards and provenance.
 There may be lower levels of consumption overall; this has
the potential for ‘nutrition transition in reverse’, with reduced
consumption of meat and livestock products.
 (Wales) Given the degree of coherence between its environ-
mental policy and measures to support the farm base, Wales
is better placed than England to meet the challenges in this
scenario.
Scenario 4: ‘Food in Crisis’
Multiple shocks disrupt food production and supply. Prices skyrocket
as stocks plummet, triggering food shortages, famine and civil panic.
Against a background of low global food stocks, the 2008 food price
peaks are a reminder of how quickly localized, serious shortages can
develop.
Wheat
 Pig, poultry and egg producers rely on grain for feed. They
could go out of business if grain supplies are diverted to
human food production or if prices rise prohibitively.
 (Scotland) Scotland already has a high proportion of grass-
fed livestock so rising feed costs will have a less of an
impact, or adaptation will be easier.
 Restrictions on trade and consumer preferences for local
food could see retailers switching to UK sources and thus
driving more locally/regionally based supply solutions.
 (Scotland) Scotch whisky, and therefore the Scottish
economy, will suffer if increased volumes of cereal are
directed towards food manufacture.
 The EU will have the option of lifting restrictions such as
those associated with farm-based environmental regulation,
product testing and the fast-track approval of novel foods
(e.g. GM foodstuffs).
Dairy
 Herd replacement will become a key factor determining the
success of individual farming units. This will be dependent
on the availability of replacements and access to capital.
 There will be some switching from dairy products to crops,
which will place additional pressure on resources such as
fertilizer.
 (Wales) Welsh agriculture has a particular vulnerability in its
over-reliance on livestock.
 (Wales) Acute rises in oil prices and transport costs would
be a severe disadvantage to Welsh producers and proces-
sors who are located at a distance from their main markets.
 Product ranges will rapidly be rationalized with a focus on
basic foods (less processing). Substitute dairy products may
gain in importance.
 UK production will switch predominantly to liquid milk,
resulting in over-capacity in the processing sector. Stocks of
dairy products (UHT milk, cheese) will be run down.
 Securing supplies of raw materials will become a key priority.
This could trigger more partnership-based approaches
across the supply network, with retailers more likely to invest
directly in farm-based operations.
 Supply chains will shorten and simplify, prompting a focus on
local production wherever viable.
 Enforcement of food standards will become even more
crucial, particularly to combat any rise in ‘fake foods’.
 In circumstances of severe crisis, judgments as to the
national interest may mean that some elements of EU policy
are temporarily set aside.
a Global economic circumstances would suggest that the scenario of ‘Just a Blip’ is already occurring, even though participants at the time thought this an unlikely event. However, many still see
this as temporary relief, with increased volatility in commodity markets, concerns over resource scarcity and increasing price pressures on energy all still creating the potential to move into the
other scenarios over the medium term.
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Prices and prospects
Global circumstances and the resulting pressures on supply
are likely to combine to create higher food prices for the
EU/UK. The recent softening of prices (wheat futures had
fallen from the high of £180 per tonne in 2007 to just
around £90 per tonne in December 200892) is viewed by
workshop contributors as a ‘fragile peace’, one that could
be broken at any time by the effects of underlying imbal-
ances in global supply and demand.While the oil price had
fallen below $50 a barrel as of December 2008, tight
market conditions are expected to return in line with
eventual global economic recovery.93 Higher oil prices and
higher input costs for fertilizers and animal feed are likely
to continue to be important drivers of food prices in the
coming decade. The relative level of sterling will remain a
key factor, and its recent weakening has contributed to
inflationary pressures on inputs. A further expansion of
the EU’s environmental regulation regime, along with the
introduction of carbon pricing, could also exacerbate the
position in the short to medium term. The pain will
increase if adjustments continue to have to be made in the
context of a sustained global economic downturn.
For the British consumer, this spells the end of the era of
cheap food and an increasingly challenging market-place for
business. Higher food prices along with increasing energy
and fuel costs will create further pressures on disposable
income and create a potentially difficult operating envi-
ronment. As price becomes ever more strongly the over-
riding purchasing factor, there could be stagnation in areas
of the market focused on premium/niche foods, and
values-based products (organic, fair trade and higher
welfare ranges).
The future could also see increased social division, with
those on lower incomes hardest hit by price rises.
Industry’s response to market changes – product reformu-
lations and a marked bifurcation between commodity and
premium foods – could make access to healthier diets
more difficult for lower-income groups. Managing
inflation will present major challenges to the food supply
network. It will be hard to strike the balance required
between consumer expectations, the need to increase
market share, and belief in the ability of a competitive food
system to deliver year-on-year cost reductions. Particular
tensions are likely to emerge over consumer acceptance of
tax burdens created by health or environmental policy
priorities. At the same time, and paradoxically, it is higher
prices that could fuel the investment required to develop
more sustainable patterns of behaviour. In this regard,
reducing waste and encouraging lower levels of consump-
tion, including of the more resource-intensive foods such
as meat, will become issues of increasing importance.
Supply network professionals regard a major food crisis
in the UK as highly likely. A global crisis, as described in
Scenario 4, could spill over into the UK. A crisis could
develop through some form of external ‘shock’ such as
animal or crop disease, or extreme weather events. A
global food crisis caused by harvest failure and food
shortages could also impact directly on British interests
through restrictions in trade and reduced availability of
both agricultural commodities and key inputs to
domestic food production. But one feature of the new
market circumstances is that the state of ‘crisis’ can occur
without a specific disruptive event. Workshop partici-
pants took the view that the more extreme effects
normally associated with ‘crisis’ are likely to be experi-
enced simply by remaining in a sustained period of
inflation (in circumstances described in the Food
Inflation scenario).
Within the sectors examined in the course of this research,
reliance on global trade is increasingly identified as a strategic
issue. Although the UK sources 55% of its imports from the
EU,94 the total masks a high level of reliance on non-EU
sources for fruit, animal feed (soya), and fertilizers (some
32% of which are sourced from non-EU countries).95 While
the FAO-OECD projects growth in global trade, these
predictions are made under certain contained assumptions
around energy prices, and any steep rises could cause some
contraction. In addition, the predicted growth may not be
sufficient to offset the very strong competition for
commodities fuelled by rising global demand (signalled by
the projection of continued below-average stock-to-use
ratios for cereals in particular).96 Rising demand for agricul-
tural products will add to pressures on key resources such
as water, oil and minerals. Supplies of phosphate are
becoming scarcer, making those countries with concentrated
resources increasingly important for global agriculture.97
Price volatility and the growing impact of climate change
on harvests will also increase uncertainties.
The need for a more sustainable system
Environmental sustainability is seen as a major concern that
will affect the capacity of UK business and agriculture to
remain competitive and increase market share. Adaptation
to changes in climate and the need to reduce damaging
greenhouse gas emissions are considered key priorities.
One crucial question for the future of the food system will
be how to manage the transition to a sustainable system that
can also deliver the desired volume of food. Although
current methods of industrialized agriculture are widely
recognized as ultimately unsustainable, there is huge
debate about the ways in which agriculture should be
required to adapt. The term ‘agro-ecological approaches’,
as originally conceived within the scenario Into a New Era
(it was later changed to ‘eco-technological approaches’),
was intended to embrace a wide range of systems.
However, within the industry the term ‘agro-ecological’
was seen to be synonymous with organic systems and
engendered little confidence that there was any convincing
prospect of these types of systems delivering the yields
required. Rightly or wrongly, they are perceived as
producing significantly lower yields than current systems
while being more land- and labour-intensive. If organic
production is taken as a basis for comparison, available
data in the UK suggest wheat yields of around 4.5–5
tonnes/ha,98 compared with an average UK yield for wheat
of 7.2 tonnes/ha;99 this difference is predominantly due to
the leverage delivered by the application of inorganic
fertilizer. Organic dairy systems are also likely to produce
33% less output than their conventional counterparts.100
However, non-organic fertilizer application is problematic
in terms of both pollution and emissions. It has become
established practice over the last 50 years and has only
recently seen a decline in usage (nitrogen application rates
have dropped by 22% from 1983 levels101). Higher fertilizer
prices and increasing regulation, such as the introduction
of nitrate control zones, may be greater incentives for
farmers to switch to lower usage rates. But a combination
of ingrained practice and concerns over any detrimental
effect on yields would make it very tough to deliver any
radical change of approach. Moreover, stakeholders believe
that environmental regulation threatens to ignore the
requirements and priorities of the food system. Many in
the UK wheat industry, for instance, fear that further
restrictions proposed on pesticide use would severely
reduce cereal and horticultural crop yields across the EU.102
In the dairy industry, there is concern that the introduc-
tion of nitrate control zones, particularly across England,
could also lead to restricted output.
UK system capacity
There is widespread concern over the erosion of capacity
within the UK farming sector and its reduced ability to
compete in the global arena. While land prices have risen,
values of other fixed assets such as buildings and
machinery have declined by 14% since 1990.103
Productivity has tailed off since 2002 and in comparison
with other nations the UK agricultural sector shows very
poor growth and levels of efficiency.104 Economies of scale
play a large part, as does the failure to exploit supporting
technologies.
Investment in farm expansion, innovation and skills is
central to maintaining competitiveness. Notwithstanding
higher prices and higher levels of income, investors are
discouraged by the curtailing of margins in the wheat and
dairy sectors through rising input costs. The high price of
land is also an important factor. UK fiscal policy (in
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particular capital gains tax and agricultural property
relief) encourages land ownership as a speculative invest-
ment. The owner-occupier model of farming is favoured
while tenant farmers and potential new entrants to
farming are disadvantaged, although contract farming has
increasingly proved to be a significant route in. The rise in
contract farming, which is also linked to the adoption of
new sustainability-led ideas and methods, is significant
given the reported high average age of UK farmers (58,
although this statistic may be misleading owing to the way
farm ownership is reported).105
There are also uncertainties over the longer-term
capacity of some sectors of the UK agricultural base. While
the wheat sector is considered robust, the dairy sector is
more vulnerable. A significant contraction could follow
either a shock-based disruption such as animal disease, or
sustained economic uncertainties fuelled by continued
high input costs and increased global competition. In
addition, stakeholders express concern that further envi-
ronmental measures to manage pollution (such as an
increase in the number of nitrate control zones) or the
extension of proposed carbon trading schemes to include
the dairy sector, would have a disproportionate effect on
this sector.
The food processing and manufacturing sector has also
seen capital expenditure fall by 21% since 1998.106 The influx
of capital is vital to keep facilities efficient and competitive,
and indeed investment will need to increase over the
coming years to help support any transition to lower-
carbon and more resource-efficient systems and maintain
competitiveness. But any future market contraction would
reduce asset utilization and returns even more, serving to
further disincentivize investment. Investment is also being
stalled by uncertainties surrounding future EU and
national carbon trading schemes and other environmental
measures.
The viability of the food system will rely on the fair
operation of supply chains and a properly functioning
competitive framework. Future pressures on costs are likely
to drive greater consolidation in the industry, which could
heighten concerns over whether farmers are receiving a
fair share of value. The significant power advantage of the
UK retailers and concerns over the unequal balance of risk
and reward through the chain are seen as continued
barriers to the fostering of more collaborative behaviour.
Stakeholders also feel that the competition law framework
put in place to help ensure fairer markets is now in reality
acting as an additional barrier. Specific problems arise
from the prohibitions relating to horizontal agreements107
that are designed to prevent collusion and anti-competitive
behaviour but that are preventing disclosure and open
discussions between organizations. Rightly or wrongly,
further restraints on exclusive vertically based agree-
ments108 are also perceived to inhibit more collaborative
practices.
The acceptance, or not, of imported GM crops will be a
significant issue. Genetically modified varieties of maize,
soya and cotton crops are becoming widespread in major
growing regions of the world. The UK/EU relies heavily on
imports of non-GM soya from Brazil but the planting of
conventional soya crops is rapidly diminishing across
South America. This is a contributory factor to the signif-
icant increase in non-GM feed prices (soya meal from
Argentina has increased by 62% since 2004109). Feed
companies are finding it increasingly difficult to source
non-GM soya and, because of problems with traceability
and the potential for cross-contamination, to guarantee
that products are indeed 100% non-GM. This is now an
acute issue for the dairy and livestock sectors in the UK as
feed prices continue to rise out of step with retail prices.
GM is not yet accepted technology in the EU. At the time
of writing, the EU has licensed only one GM crop variety
for cultivation across Europe and imports to the bloc are
subject to strict controls and approval procedures.110 This
approach, asynchronous with those of other major trading
blocs, is unlikely to be sustainable in the longer term as
plantings of GM increase.
Government response
Food supply will become an increasingly important
political issue. There is widespread concern that govern-
ments do not fully comprehend the challenges to be
faced. The government’s belief that UK food security is
indivisible from the global situation is seen as addressing
only one part of the issue, potentially ignoring or down-
playing:
 the pressures of continuing price rises and the stresses
they will place on consumer expectations of choice
and unlimited availability;
 increased threats to supply resilience, including those
caused by global reactions to high inflation;
 the capacity of the UK food system to respond to the
challenges;
 the increasing global competition for resources;
 other countries’ willingness to address the issue of
global food security.
These factors could create a difficult balancing act for UK
governments in their pursuit of current environmental and
health priorities, particularly if fiscal measures and increased
regulation create additional cost burdens. Both devolved and
national governments could be faced with growing social
divisions as a result of higher food (and energy) prices and
will need to consider how best tominimize the impact on the
poorer sectors of society. The pace of change could become
a key factor here, and workshop participants argued strongly
for a significant role for government in shaping change,
particularly in the area of consumer response.
Differences in approaches between UK national and
devolved governments towards agricultural support may
come increasingly to the fore and could have serious implica-
tions whenever a coordinated response is called for. The
Welsh and Scottish governments place greater emphasis on
the development and support of the food system to deliver
selected policy objectives, particularly on the food system as
a provider of employment and a means of sustaining rural
communities. The devolved governments are actively
looking to provide support for agri-food chains in terms of
innovation, greater integration and collaboration.
Better crisis management is considered essential, with
national government playing a significant leadership role.
While the nature and extent of any crisis will shape
reactions, the management of the situation is more likely
to fall to industry first, with initial responses tending to
focus on protecting the viability of critical businesses. Any
government intervention could in itself exacerbate the
situation. To ensure that interventions are effective, there
is a need for more partnership-based approaches, both
within supply chains and with government, in order to
plan and coordinate – and practise – the appropriate
response to crisis.
The UK’s relationship with the EU will take on even more
significance. The EU is likely to provide the bulk of UK
food imports for the foreseeable future. Any reduction in
UK capacity or difficulties in global supply (e.g. oil-price-
led transport costs) will place even greater emphasis on
regional (i.e. EU) sourcing.
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4. The UK’s Food
Supply: Responding
to Change
The transition will be tough; finding the right way through
will become a significant determinant of national economic
wellbeing. The UK’s relationship with the EU will be key.
The new normality
The UK must respond to change by constructing food
supply arrangements that will avoid the worst effects illus-
trated in the project’s scenarios. The project’s research has
identified four characteristics as being of increasing signif-
icance in a future food supply system (see Figure 10):
 resilience – a system able to assure longer-term avail-
ability in the light of increasing global uncertainties;
 sustainability – a system that can supply safe, healthy
food with positive social benefits and low environ-
mental impacts;
 competitiveness – a system capable of delivering afford-
able food around a potentially higher baseline of costs;
 managing consumer expectations – a system which
shapes and responds to consumer preferences in line
with societal needs.
The reconciliation of these elements will create the central
challenge of the next decade. This will require a different
approach with the development of a new framework of
policies, institutions and supply system capabilities.
Sustainability
Upward trends in global population and affluence are
intensifying pressures on natural resources even as techno-
logical innovation is hampered by poorly directed or
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Box 2: The UK’s current food supply system
The last 30 years have seen a significant concentration of the UK’s
food retail business, with four major organizations controlling around
75% of sales.a Power within the system rests with these large
multiples; and it is their commitment to providing the consumer with
choice, 24/7 availability and low prices that drives the supply chain. A
major facilitator of the current arrangements has been the evolution
of a highly efficient, regionally based distribution network equipped to
deal with the huge volume and range of food demanded (just under
5 billion cases of food and drink products are moved annuallyb).
The food services sector – comprising diverse outlets from
restaurants and pubs to the non-residential provision of catering in
public institutions – now accounts for up to half of UK consumer
expenditure on food (£79bn in 2007c). With more reliance on
commodity products, its supply chains have tended to be less
sophisticated, though the larger-scale organizations are now
adopting systems similar in style and operation to the retail sector’s.
The food manufacturing sector works to rigid, retailer-led product
and service specifications, with the emphases placed on food safety
and delivery flexibility. The sector has seen a progressive erosion of
the domination of branded product suppliers, to the point where
retailer ‘own label’ suppliers now have significant market share.
Consolidation is a key trend in this sector and economies of scale
have driven migration towards centralized manufacturing plants.
The UK farming sector is highly fragmented, with over 300,000
registered holdings.d A wide variety of business models is employed,
but predominantly based on farmer ownership of land (69%); this has
remained fairly static since 1990.e Some 63% are judged to be below
the minimum threshold for good margins and farm-gate prices remain
a contentious issue. Since reform of the EU’s Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP), subsidy payments still provide a major source of income,
although the basis of payment has switched away from incentivizing
volume to a land-based subsidy linked to compliance with environ-
mental standards. Their relative lack of bargaining power in the supply
network has led producers to develop more direct means of sales (e.g.
farmers’ markets). Livestock and arable products are predominantly
channelled through a trading system, often managed by third parties;
relationships here are often of a short-term, transactional nature. The
dairy and horticulture sectors have seen a rise in more integrated
chains with direct, contractual relationships with manufacturers and
more recently retailers. Here, producers are incentivized through
pricing schemes to meet tighter quality and other product specifica-
tions, directly linked to retailer requirements.
Figure 11 provides a view of the dynamic operating in the UK
food supply chain and its resource footprint (excluding imports).
Food production draws on a high proportion of UK resources in
the form of land for agriculture, water and use of road infrastruc-
ture to transport food. It will be seen that energy usage and
directly emitted carbon are concentrated in two sectors of the
supply chain. The first is agriculture, through both the produc-
tion/application of fertilizer and methane emissions from livestock;
the second is retail, with its reliance on store/depot refrigeration,
home transportation, home refrigeration and home preparation.
The intermediate stages of the supply chain are more industrial-
ized and use/emit comparatively less energy and carbon. On
average, over 50% of the volume channelled through the system
is wasted, a significant portion of this within the home.
a TNS Worldpanel data (2007), Great Britain Consumer Spend: 12 Weeks to 07 September 2007. Available online at
http://www.tnsglobal.com/_assets/files/TNS_Market_Research_Supermarket_Share-data-commentary.pdf.
b IGD (2007), Retail Logistics 2007. December 2006 (IGD, Watford).
c Defra (2007), Agriculture in the United Kingdom.
d Ibid.
e EUROSTAT (2008), http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat (last accessed 24 June 2008).
Figure 11: The UK food supply system
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This is an indicative interpretation of the UK supply network. Waste figures based on work undertaken by the
Food Process innovation Unit at Cardiff University on behalf of the Food Chain Centre. WRAP estimates have
been used for consumer waste figures. Available online at:
http://www.wrap.org.uk/wrap_corporate/news/food_waste_set_to.html (15.10.08).
insufficient investment. As a result, food will become an
embedded component of a new ‘bio-economy’ that will see
government increasingly managing economic success
around available resources. In these circumstances,
sustainability as a concept must address a complex set of
both global and more local-scale issues. There is much to
be done if the required – generational – change in thinking
and practice is to be achieved.
Sustainability is normally defined in terms of three
pillars – economic prosperity, social development and
environmental protection – but its meaning differs widely
across society and industry, with a tendency for policy and
business strategy to focus on narrower and more superfi-
cial applications. Although the UK government has artic-
ulated a set of sustainable development principles,111
various studies have identified an apparent lack of vision in
mapping out the detail of what a sustainable food system
would look like.112 Policy responses and measures already
in place are tied to a series of as yet only loosely connected
issues (bio-diversity, carbon emissions). In the continuing
absence of a credible roadmap, there is a risk that the
current policy framework for delivering environmental
benefits will be too narrowly focused. The recent history of
biofuels is an uncomfortable example of this. In the case of
food specifically, the social aspects of sustainability are far
from fully developed. The social impact of the food system
goes much wider than just health, providing as it does
employment and income for local communities (a factor of
particular importance for rural communities, especially
those in Wales and Scotland).
A crucial component of a sustainable food system will be
its reliance on small-footprint technology; an emissions
reduction of the order of at least 75% will be needed in the
longer term to balance the (estimated) combined growth in
the UK’s population and affluence.113 This would require a
step change in innovation, one akin to the ‘double Green
revolution,’114 plus improvements in efficiency, quality and
waste reduction – in effect a new agricultural paradigm. The
principle of eco-efficiency will be an essential element in the
development of new food supply models. This form of effi-
ciency is focused on reducing the environmental footprint
of production: instead of production at lowest levels of cost,
eco-efficiency aims at production with least environmental
cost. Eco-efficiency for energy includes technology for
reduction in end-use energy consumption and the develop-
ment of renewable energy sources. Eco-efficiency for
materials includes reducing the amount of material required
for product manufacture and the reuse of materials through
recycling. Opportunities for eco-efficiency in agriculture
include methane digesters for energy generation,
controlled-release fertilizer formulas to reduce runoff,
recycling of waste biomass as ‘green fertilizer’, and drip irri-
gation systems to reduce water use. There are also new
‘biological farming’ practices in prospect. Access to these
types of technology will become a key determinant of capa-
bility, and only by investing more in R&D (in agriculture
and other food supply areas) will the UK be able to capitalize
on what could be highly significant global developments.
New, differently targeted, programmes of R&D will be
required to support the transition to a lower-input, more
regenerative system. Expertise in areas such as nutrient
cycling, energy balance optimization, system synergies and
life-cycle costing will acquire a new importance.
The balance between lower-input systems and produc-
tivity will also become a key focus for consideration as
work is undertaken to develop and adopt a new agricul-
tural paradigm, a process that will take several years. The
technology gap implied, together with tensions between
different agricultural systems, promises a turbulent period
of transformation. But if the issue remains unaddressed, it
is likely that a more fragmented approach to UK farming
will emerge, with only a proportion of farmers overall
implementing a range of different eco-technical solutions.
Here a central challenge, one that may directly influence
the direction and timing of developmental studies, will be
the incremental incorporation into the food supply system
and its products of what are currently externalized costs –
for example, those relating to carbon and other green-
house gas emissions. For those who are quick off the mark,
competitive advantage will follow.
The issue of sustainability is not confined to agriculture;
it is a system-wide problem. In particular, there is an
increased appreciation across supply networks of the need
to tackle both greenhouse gas emissions and waste.
Adverse economic conditions will continue to focus
attention on the range of already existing or proposed
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credible waste reduction initiatives. Emissions issues are
more difficult. Until a clear economic value is assessed and
attached to new lower-carbon systems, there will be few
incentives for change. The system has a built-in inertia,
partly as a result of capital already invested. It will also only
move towards change as fast as the market allows; and
food supply businesses will be reluctant to embrace new
models unless and until they feel consumers are truly
demanding that they do so. Further research will be
needed to develop and evaluate food supply models that
meet acceptable sustainable criteria, but the characteristics
required are likely to include:
 linked national, regional and local perspectives;
 a significantly reduced resource footprint, specifically
a reduction in reliance on agriculture’s oil-based
inputs;
 a synergy of contributing systems that will generate
minimum levels of energy and other resource
requirements;
 a regenerative rather than (net) extractive approach
in the areas of production and distribution – partic-
ular issues will arise around the creation of better
coordinated and optimized land use and the recycling
of available raw materials;
 the concept of zero net waste across the whole system;
 the development of the network structures and
systems that will manage the new flows;
 the management of consumer choice to fit new
consumer–producer relationships;
The provision of the information needed to inform
choices around the supply network will be of critical
importance but this issue in itself is rife with complexi-
ties. How can consistent measurement schemes for envi-
ronmental and social impacts be established? How can
the need to maintain cost competitiveness be balanced
against the potential burden of increased product trace-
ability? How should products’ performance be weighted
relative to environmental, health or other welfare-based
criteria? How can information be presented to supply
chain partners and consumers alike in a coherent and
practical way?
The broader application of higher EU standards of
sustainability will need to be carefully balanced. Unless
similar requirements are imposed on imports from non-
EU sources, there is a risk that, in effect, unsustainable
practices will be exported rather than dealt with. On the
other hand, compliance difficulties could lead to a
contraction in trade that would conflict with the goal of
supporting agriculture in developing countries. Unilateral
imposition of higher standards for traded products could
be perceived globally as a new form of EU protectionism
and any such measures would need careful handling at a
World Trade Organization level.
Resilience
Resilience may be conventionally defined as the ability of
supply systems to provide an uninterrupted supply of
quality food in sufficient volume and range to meet the
needs of the UK consumer. Risks to resilience are usually
conceived in terms of sudden disruptive shocks followed by
an all too familiar (if invariably painful) process of recovery
to competitiveness. But concerns about sustainability are
now generating an additional ecological dimension that
focuses on the food system’s basic ability to continue to
function.115 This shift from maintaining efficiency of
function (engineering resilience) to maintaining existence
of function (ecological resilience) will take time to be
developed and incorporated. In the meantime, if the food
system is to keep operating successfully, its ability to
recognize and respond to broader uncertainties inherent in
the new operating environment must improve significantly.
Wider questions such as the availability of basic resources –
land, water, energy and skills – as well as growing competi-
tion for raw materials will create an entirely different sense
of what constitutes ‘risk’.
It will be increasingly important to understand the
dependencies inherent in the UK’s food supply system,
particularly those with a global dimension. The current
underlying balance between domestic, EU and global
sources may at first sight appear to score well in terms of
resilience. The EU is by far the largest source of UK food
imports.116 But there are key exceptions. The supply of fruit
to the UKmarket is particularly reliant on global trade, the
UK being only 10% self-sufficient in this sector.117 UK food
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production also continues to be critically dependent,
particularly for key inputs such as animal feed (soya) and
fertilizer (Figure 12), on a small number of sources in the
wider global market-place. In a world where trade of food
and resources may become subject to more political
control, these will need to be kept under critical review.
Increasing strategic control of food is already in
evidence. Recent market responses in nearly 40 countries
around the world, delivered principally through the
imposition of export controls,118 provide a sharp reminder
that reliance on a fully functioning global trade system
comes with a degree of risk. Recent UK government
policy advocates the promotion of global food security as
the means to guarantee domestic food security.119 Raising
agricultural productivity in developing countries and
reducing trade distortions will help to improve global food
security;120 but, in an environment where bilateral rela-
tionships designed to secure national food supplies are
increasing, there is no guarantee that an expanded global
pot would secure supplies for the UK. Indicators suggest
that major Asian and Middle Eastern countries are
already bypassing the world trade system altogether,
pursuing bilateral deals (including the leasing of land) to
secure essential supplies such as oil, minerals and agricul-
tural products to support economic growth and food
security.121While there is little evidence yet to suggest that
this is affecting global availability of products, there is
some unease within the UK industry about these develop-
ments. And while more research is needed, an argument
may be made for the UK (and the EU) to take a more
pragmatic approach in ensuring commercial access to
non-EU-sourced supplies and products (potentially
through the use of bilateral deals and more measures to
encourage a more productive and competitive domestic
agricultural base).
Some UK sectors may be more vulnerable than others.
A crisis event (such as animal disease or extreme weather
such as flooding) or even continued inflationary
pressures on inputs would have disproportionate effects
on livestock sectors. Key agricultural skills or assets –
prime agricultural land, animal herds – would take many
years to recover. The interdependencies between the
sectors may also have consequences for resilience within
the system as a whole. Such considerations raise the
hugely significant questions of whether a minimum
production capacity may need to be established within
the UK, or whether critical thresholds are required below
which sectors, such as dairy, should not be allowed to
decline. This does not imply a return to protectionism,
nor is it a plea for self-sufficiency; rather it reflects a need
to extend to food supply the global awareness of risk and
uncertainty that is already embedded in the security,
defence and other sectors.
Traditionally, resilience strategies focus on the building
in of systems redundancy, either through excess capacity
or through increased stocks. In the context of food supply,
these must be treated with caution. It is true that more
regionally based supply systems could be more robust,
particularly in times of crisis. But they are also are likely to
attract additional facility costs and create negative impacts
on the environment through less efficient transport
systems. The establishment of national or regional
strategic stocks is also a recognized response to supply
volatility and uncertainty. Proponents of free trade would
argue that such measures contribute to price inflation in
the short term and send a negative signal to the market
that leads to lower supply and high prices in the longer
term.
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Figure 12: Sources of UK food, feed and fertilizer
Sources: Food: Defra (27 March 08) Agriculture in the United Kingdom, Chart 7.5,
https://statistics.defra.gov.uk/esg/publications/auk/2007/excel.asp (data are
2006, based on the farm-gate value of unprocessed food; processed foods are
revalued to their unprocessed value).
Feed: Calculated using feed information from HGCA (2007) Market Data Centre,
http://www.hgca.com/data/ and data from FAOSTAT (accessed 15 August 08),
http://faostat.fao.org/ (data are an average 2000–05).
Fertilizer: UK HM Revenue and Customs UK Trade Info (accessed 17 September
2008), http://194.223.26.124/HMRC/TableViewer/tableView.aspx (data are
2007, based on volume). Includes all types of fertilizer (code 31).
Although the building of resilience is an increasingly
multi-faceted endeavour, basic contingency planning will
remain a cornerstone of the management of risk and
uncertainty. Organizations, both small and large, will
need to have adequate arrangements in place for their
own operations and an understanding of how they relate
to others in the supporting supply network. But
corporate planning is not enough; responses to develop-
ments must be engineered, tested and exercised at a
system level, with inputs coordinated between all stake-
holders, including government. There is a widespread
perception that a more detailed governmental under-
standing of food supply networks is required, not least to
ensure that any interventions do not exacerbate problems
or create unintended consequences. Scenario-planning
approaches, along with effective horizon scanning, are to
be encouraged to ensure that wider uncertainties are
considered.
Competitiveness
Higher oil prices, continuing global supply-demand
constraints and the cost of implementing environmental
regulations will maintain pressures on input costs and
commodity prices. The delivery of affordable, if still more
expensive, food will rest on the supply system’s ability to
dampen the worst effects. For example, although the level
of sterling is a major factor in relative price competitive-
ness, it is likely that retailers will continue to focus on the
most globally competitive solution. Inflationary effects
and the need to cut costs could see some migration of
secondary processing activities out of the UK towards
areas with lower labour costs. That would particularly suit
companies with a multinational presence. However, if the
oil price recovers over the longer term (>$100 per barrel),
the consequent hike in transport costs may force a more
regional focus on the supply of bulk commodities,122
though any such moves will need to be judged also in
resilience and sustainability terms. Continuing price
pressures are also likely to reinforce the intensive farming
model globally and across the EU agricultural base.
Further increases in intensification are possible, signalling
increased tensions between different agricultural
approaches.
The ‘old’ definition of competitiveness, based solely
on economic criteria, is already under strain. The search
is on for a ‘new’ approach that builds longer-term
ecological and social needs into financial and supply
chain business models. Part of the challenge will be the
incremental incorporation into the food supply system
and its products of what are currently externalized costs
– for example, those relating to CO2 and other green-
house gas emissions. In that regard, the definition of effi-
ciency will need to be expanded to encompass effective
resource access and utilization, an essential component
of future competitive advantage. Associated policy and
regulation will need to be developed in parallel to facili-
tate these changes (such as implementation of a stan-
dardized system for costing of carbon and other exter-
nalities).
The period of transition to a lower-carbon/lower-input
system will present particular difficulties for the
resilience and competitiveness of UK agriculture.
Livestock sectors face specific problems in securing
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions; arable and horti-
culture sectors face a potential drop in yields. Without
some level of support, they will fail. There will also be a
need to support technological development and the
introduction of innovative agricultural practices.
Questions remain about the levels of public- and private-
sector agricultural R&D and how they can be increased
in an environment of limited economic growth; agricul-
tural investment is particularly dependent on confidence
in the sector’s prospects for stable returns. Innovation
and the adoption of new practices will be essential, and
the encouragement of new entrants will help to revitalize
the sector. For this to happen, current UK policy incen-
tives and regulations towards land ownership will need to
be reviewed.
Governments will need to continue to work towards
shaping a framework that allows access to the necessary
capital for smaller producers and new entrants to invest in
and develop sustainable, productive practices as well as
incentivizing investment in other areas of the food chain.
The forms of support needed are issues that should guide
the UK’s negotiation on the reform of the CAP post-2012.
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Managing consumer expectations
In the UK, ‘the problem’ up to now has been over-consump-
tion, not insecurity of supply. Consumers have grown to
expect a plethora of choice and all-year-round availability of
food, and expectations that prices will continue to fall as a
percentage of discretionary spend are embedded in modern
lifestyles. But the analysis and scenarios show how this
expectation may well be challenged by events. The key
political challenge will be the balance to be struck between
individual consumer preference on food and the wider
choices made by society on the systems that supply it.
The extent to which consumers are likely to drive the
transformation of the current system is a key point of
debate. Some of today’s enlightened consumers are already
demonstrating the core values that chime with ideals of
sustainability, and almost 80% of consumers have had
some engagement with ethical shopping.123 Almost a third
recognize climate change and packaging waste as issues of
concern.124 But reliance on a single consumer ‘voice’ to
direct the market towards sustainable behaviour patterns
seems misplaced; the customer requirement is likely
instead to manifest itself as a set of fragmented and diverse
responses.
Both industry and government need to acknowledge
their responsibilities in helping consumers make
informed choices. But the way ahead is not easy. An
expansion of current labelling-based initiatives to
address the resources impact of products will encounter
complex and apparently competing criteria and it will be
very difficult to communicate clearly to the consumer the
net benefit of purchase in each case. Measures such as
‘back-room’ selection of more sustainable products on
behalf of the consumer (choice editing) are considered to
be a more fruitful route. An important early step will be
for government, industry and civil society jointly to
create an understanding of what constitutes a sustainable
consumption pattern. The correct balance will need to be
struck between industry and government ‘push’ (e.g.
choice editing) and consumer ‘pull’ (demand for more
sustainable products).
‘The key political challenge will be
the balance to be struck between
individual consumer preference on
food and the wider choices made
by society on the systems that
supply it’
5. The New Dynamic
Work must start now to create a UK food supply that meets
new standards of resilience, sustainability and competitive-
ness based on stakeholder partnerships
To deliver the new arrangements, the UK will need
policies, systems, institutions and capabilities (knowledge,
skills, technology, processes, structure and behaviours)
that successfully reconcile resilience, sustainability and
competitive advantage with consumer needs (the
‘enablers/disablers’ of Figure 10). The EU will continue to
play an important role in supporting future UK food
requirements. Future governance frameworks for a
sustainable food system have to reside at an EU level, in
case any major differences in approach create competition
distortions across the free trade bloc. Future UK policy
responses will need to carefully consider how best to
maintain and develop the EU relationship to strike an
appropriate balance between national and wider interests.
Technology will play a significant role in delivering the
step change needed in global productivity, and for the UK
transition to sustainable production. Success will depend on
both the development of new technology, and the transfer
and sharing of existing technologies and best practice.
The level of both private and publicly funded UK agricul-
tural research has seen a reduction in real terms of around
40% between 2002 and 2006.125 The declining levels of UK
investment raise real questions over the country’s ability to
maintain a viable domestic agricultural R&D base, or to
access technology developed in the EU or globally. A Defra
study points to the UK as a follower rather than a leader in
agricultural technology.126 Demands on the government to
set a clear agenda for general andmore targeted research are
likely to increase, along with calls for an urgent review of the
level of public funding required, both to contribute to the
global challenge but also to support innovation within UK-
based food systems. Part of delivering the required change
will be better support for research-based institutes and help
in developing the private-public partnership frameworks
needed to support technology transfer, particularly across
the agricultural base.
As part of the coordinated technological response, the
debate over GM technology will need to be reopened. GM
crops are cited by many food supply professionals as among
the tools required in efforts to reconcile the maintenance of
agricultural productivity with more sustainable and afford-
able food production. The issue remains highly contentious
in the UK/EU. Objections centre on a number of issues
including health concerns, problems with loss of bio-
diversity, coexistence with other crops, and the patenting of
crops that creates concerns about the degree of access for
small farms.127 In addition, traceability is likely to become a
critical concern as GM crops that produce pharmaceuticals
and industrial feed-stocks are more widely introduced.
While national government has taken steps to reopen the
debate,128 the Welsh and Scottish governments have taken a
strong line against GM products and are looking to preserve
their GM-free commitments. Further debates among
supporters within the producer base, between UK national
and devolved governments and between the EU and other
trading blocs over GM policy can be expected.
Many of the policies needed to harness scarce resources
will involve consumer behaviour. In a resource-conscious
world waste minimization will be vital to economic
success; but where waste arises, options beyond disposal,
which generate secondary resource, will be vital. Policies
to determine effective land utilization and to conserve
water and energy are dependent on wide-ranging public
participation and support (e.g. the location of waste
processing and recycling plants). Consumer buy-in is
particularly vital in relation to the deployment of tech-
nologies, not merely genetic modification of plants but
also those involved in related sectors such as energy and
packaging. The technologies needed to deliver a new
model of food production may be many and varied and
may cut across current entrenched positions. Better
engagement with the public over the framing of questions
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Table 1: New and emerging supply chain requirements
Farming system
Supply processes
Products
Assets and
structures
Relationships
Strategies
Old models
 High input systems.
 Established practices.
 Subsidies without condition, price support.
 High levels of inefficiencies pre-2005.
 Mid-term reform of CAP begins process of consolidation of
farming businesses. Ownership and production start to separate.
 Focus on volume production pre-2005. Mid-term review
begins process of aligning production to market
requirement.
 Organizational risk management.
 Individual measures based on quality, cost and delivery
performance.
 Process efficiency.
 Management of product flows.
 Wide product choice.
 Large, capital-intensive assets.
 Investment decisions based on production cost per unit.
 Efficient distribution systems.
 Vertical transactional relationships. Limited horizontal
collaboration.
 Linear relationships.
 Sector-based engagement.
 Price vs product differentiation.
Emerging models
 Low input/high output optimized systems.
 High levels of experimentation.
 Waste reuse.
 Subsidies dependent on sustainable production practices.
 Support structures for investment, knowledge transfer and
technology access (rather than direct support).
 Competitiveness through horizontal collaborative models.
 Increase in farm scale along with separation of ownership
and production.
 Optimization of resources to align with sustainable goals.
 Minimization of losses in whole system through horizontal
production networks and vertical supply chain efficiency.
 System-based risk management.
 Crisis management for whole chain.
 Shared measurement systems based on cost-competitiveness.
Compliance with public requirements for resilience and
sustainability.
 Resource efficiency.
 Integration and management of waste streams with product
flows.
 Product rationalization and editing of choice, based on
higher standards.
 Use of substitutes and alternative ingredients.
 More flexible use of assets.
 Increased investment in smaller-scale assets.
 New assets related to waste reuse lead to more horizontal
collaboration, particularly in producer networks.
 Investment decisions based on total cost of ownership (inc.
environmental costs).
 National models developed alongside regional sourcing
overlaid on efficient distribution models. Inefficient local
models replaced by local solutions integrated with existing
efficient distribution models.
 Greater horizontal collaborative relationships.
 Longer-term supply contracts where power is in equilibrium.
 Partnerships with other sectors/industries.
 Interlinkage of whole chain, from farm through to consumer.
 Engagement with all stakeholders.
 Additional competition based on low environmental impacts
due to high public incentives and costs of non-sustainable
supply.
of the application of such technologies will be vital to avoid
impasse at a time when swift response may be required.
Supply chain arrangements will need to be restructured.
This will require the formation of new, competitive business
models that reflect the higher cost base. Investment
decisions and strategy formulation will need to expand from
the current narrow model of cost, quality and delivery to
deliver a wider set of criteria – carbon reduction, resource
utilization, social and environmental impacts, supply chain
capability, etc. Product ranges will need to be balanced
against these wider considerations, and this will probably
lead to considerably less consumer choice. Less choice, but
with ranges which offer higher product standards, would
also help to deliver significant health and environmental
benefits. The choices made will be delivered through retail
and branded product specifications that will have to be
adapted significantly; andmechanisms will have to be found
for a ‘framework of integrity’ to operate across the supply
chain as a whole to monitor compliance. Some indicators of
how current characteristics of the system may need to
change are presented in Table 1.
Constraints on resources and increased difficulties in
sourcing rawmaterials and other inputs point to amove away
from simple transactional relationships to longer-term
contracts and substantive relationships with suppliers. Supply
shortage will tend to shift some power back to producers.
Other pressures such as assuring product standards through
the chain and the need for coordinated crisis management
also indicate a turning point in supply relationships. These
factors will drive a need for increased information-sharing
across the chain and greater transparency of standards.
Chains currently disconnected from consumers will need to
create a more integrated approach. Retailers and the major
food service providers will remain key, both in driving
forward the new models and standards and in fostering
better relationships. With or without government regulation
and/or changes in shareholder expectations, retailers in
particular will need to adapt their practices to alter the
balance of risk and reward throughout the chain.
There are likely to be conflicting visions of the new
system, and tensions between potentially competing goals
will define the UK’s food supply arrangements for the
coming decade (Figure 13). A fault line exists between
those advocating radical restructuring and those who
believe the solutions lie in the adaptation of current
arrangements. Future strategies and policy must be based
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Figure 13: Transition from old to new goals
on consideration of all the elements as a whole, with
inevitable trade-offs that will include addressing the
following questions:
 How far can standards of health, safety, welfare and
ethics be maintained in sustainable food supply?
 How can a competitive system be maintained that
provides affordable food while remaining socially and
environmentally sustainable?
 How can a resilient system be developed within the
context of geo-political uncertainties?
 How should policy be shaped in order to encourage
more sustainable behaviours but without inhibiting
UK cost-competiveness?
 What should be the balance between the market and
the state in the future system?
National government is responding, with the outcome of
one major review of food policy already published129 and
other policy work in the pipeline. The Welsh and Scottish
governments also launched significant consultation
documents on food strategy and policy in 2008.130
Governmental thinking overall appears to be framed
around the following guiding principles:
 keeping food prices for consumers low;
 encouraging access to open, competitive markets;
 maintaining food safety;
 ensuring environmental sustainability;
 delivering healthier diets;
 keeping the state’s fiscal burden as low as possible.
The increasing political profile of food, and impending
CAP reform, will force national and devolved govern-
ments to consider their leadership roles in taking the
debate forward. Part of this is the recognition of the role
they will have to play in ensuring the competitiveness and
resilience of the food supply system in the face of attempts
to narrow free trade under global resource constraints.
There would seem to be little tension between UK self-
interest and the wider need to ensure that trade in food is
free and fair. Government also has a role in ensuring
sustainability in the food supply chain and in leading and
shaping consumer expectations. The moral and ethical
dimensions of trade may also become more important for
UK consumers. Along with objectives of supporting the
economies of developing countries, the resource footprint
associated with imports will need to be factored in to trade
policy and individual procurement decisions.
Ultimately, UK governments will be expected to
develop, in line with the EU, the overarching policies and
regulatory framework plus any necessary market
reframing that will be needed to meet the wider chal-
lenges. Their current thinking131 needs to be broadened
and developed into a clear vision of the UK’s future food
system. A vital first step will be for governments to gain an
understanding, sector by sector, of the operation and
complexities of current food supply arrangements.
The commercial sector remains best placed to deliver
the operational capability required to meet the new goals.
But it is unclear whether it can easily reconcile today’s
commercial imperatives – locked as they are into current
business models – with the wider public interest. In partic-
ular, the development of new food supply models will
require a different mind-set. A vital component of the
process will be the incorporation of true supply costs,
many of which are currently externalized – carbon and
water being the obvious and major examples. Ingrained
short-termism will need to evolve into a more strategic
focus. That may be illustrated on one level as the difference
between industry’s current ‘fire-fighting’ obsession with
immediate public issues – quality of ingredients, obesity
etc. – and a corporate responsibility profile that reflects a
longer-term understanding and management of the
resource footprint.
As it evolves, the system still has to be capable of deliv-
ering sufficient quantities of food for the UK population.
Domestic production will continue to play a significant
role in the UK food’s supply. Indeed, as resources come
under pressure, and in a low-carbon economy, food grown
and consumed locally will provide much more significant
benefits to the national economy. The capacity to respond
will depend on addressing the increasingly acute skills and
labour shortages. Economies of scale will continue to play
an important role in both productivity and profitability,
particularly at a farming level. However, the role of more
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regionally based systems and assets in providing a greater
degree of resilience will need to be considered. Any benefit
must be offset against potentially significant environ-
mental and cost trade-offs. Scale will also be a key
component of profitability at farm level, with land prices
likely to continue acting as a barrier to expansion. The
further development of different ownership models (such
as contract farming) may be worth exploring.
Any temptation to focus on the UK agricultural sector
in isolation must be resisted; part of the solution lies in
developing the capability of the food supply system as a
whole. There will be an extended transition period in
which a patchwork of the old and the new will be evident.
In that ferment of experiments, many of them small-scale
and ‘below the radar’, there are unlikely to be many
absolutely right answers. A set of related initiatives is likely
to be required, which go further than current UK/EU
policies and are built around new frameworks for techno-
logical innovation, waste reduction, partnership-led
approaches and acceptance of possible changes in
consumption patterns.
That in turn means that policy must avoid blanket
prescriptions and allow instead flexibility within a suitable
framework of parameters. While government may need to
step in to discourage bad practice and develop more disci-
plined frameworks (e.g. the Climate Change Bill), such
actions must be still be capable of responding to the rapid
roll-out of new technologies, processes and/or changes in
external circumstances (e.g. those explored in the
scenarios). The need for increased investment in scientific
and technological research and development, and how
such efforts should be funded, will come to the fore.
The issues raised cut across multiple areas of policy and
operational expertise. Reconciling the often conflicting
elements and combining them into coherent food supply
models for the different sectors will become the central
challenge of the next decade.
Food supply is becoming amajor political issue. The seven
fundamental influences operating in the global food system
are combining to generate circumstances that are new in
modern experience. Protecting British interests is a
necessity; advancing them by exploiting efficiently the new
opportunities on offer is a real and exciting prospect.
Developing a new national strategy and prioritizing the
sustainability and productivity of domestic food supply and
demand should complement the UK’s EU and global obliga-
tions. Alternative food arrangementsmust be structured first
and foremost around the effective utilization of resources to
become lower-input systems. This is at the heart of ‘the new
normality’. It will require a staged process of transformation,
and the work already started by the Cabinet Office andDefra
is to be warmly welcomed as a first step.
www.chathamhouse.org.uk
37
The New Dynamic
www.chathamhouse.org.uk
38
6. Conclusions and
Recommendations
Policy and political outcomes
UK food supply is already highly dependent on trade
within the EU and is likely to remain so. It follows that
much of the work on shaping a new food dynamic must lie
within Europe. Such policies cannot be as narrowly drawn
as in the past and will necessarily involve wider questions
of strategic, environmental, social and cultural considera-
tions. Continuing debate over CAP reform offers an
opportunity to redraw the boundaries of European food
policy, and the UK has already shown active interest in
carrying this debate forward.
Within this context, in re-conceiving its own food
supply arrangements, the UK must develop a clear vision
of where its national interests lie and how best they can be
met. In particular the vision should articulate how food
supply supports best outcomes in a range of policy areas
(for example, consumer health, security of supply, the
domestic economy, environmental objectives, regional
prosperity, social equity, food culture). It should also
include a statement of the UK’s strategic and geo-political
interests as they relate to resilient food supply, and a set of
principles and accompanying indicators/metrics that will
characterize a food supply business model capable of
reconciling resilience, competitiveness and evolving
consumer expectations. Its implementation will have
implications for a range of domestic policies. Health,
social, rural energy and environmental domestic policies
are all at issue here, as are outward-looking strategies for
foreign relations, trade and international development.
Workshops held in the course of the research in Edinburgh
and Cardiff encouraged the view that devolved govern-
ment provides the opportunity for testing the capacity of
localized response to the global pressures and for the
development of regionalized systems within a single
European market.
The development of a more strategic approach to the
UK’s food supply will require a programme of coordinated
work which must reflect fully the different perspectives of
devolved and central governments. Its ultimate outcome
will be UK food supply arrangements that reconcile
commercial imperatives with global realities and changing
domestic policy objectives. The new approach is likely to
be one that:
 with consumer acceptance, will operate profitably
with higher prices as a norm;
 will reconcile resilience, sustainability and competi-
tiveness.
The work should be driven by a consortium juxtaposing
the expertise of governments, supply network interests
and a range of societal groups (media, NGOs, universi-
ties), and will need to be managed through a multi-stage
plan, the outcomes of which will influence the UK’s nego-
tiations on the shape of the CAP post-2012. The key
outputs are shown in Table 2, which outlines suggestions
for the initial stages of work and longer-term areas of
study.
This work now needs to be accelerated to develop a
universal policy framework with clearer criteria and a
new set of indicators and metrics. Detailed sector-by-
sector roadmaps will also be essential. The supporting
process must be based on a systematized partnership
between stakeholders across the sectors, operating on the
basis of transparency and trust. As issues such as energy
security, food security and political security become
inexorably intertwined, the stakes are raised, as is the
price of failure.
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Table 2: Recommendations
Timescales
Initial actions
Short term
Medium term
Lines of enquiry
 Agreement on the status and scope of the consortium to
deliver the vision.
 A map of the resources, sources and dependencies
underpinning the UK food system with a focus on
identifying potential vulnerabilities.
 An examination of the critical mass of UK food production
sectors, the minimum level at which they could function and
the implications of the loss of certain elements.
 The development of measures to encourage increased
investment in agriculture to encourage both highly
productive and sustainable practices.
 The nature of consumer demand and its capacity to adjust
to social and cultural expectations in the light of market
realities and policy priorities.
 The national, devolved, regional, local dimensions of food
and its role as a determinant of identity.
 The desired consumer outcomes including the nature of a
sustainable diet.
 The role of regulation, ‘consumer choice editing’ and
marketing in shaping consumer choice.
 Research into the best application of investment in R&D to
ensure acceptable food supply and (more ambitiously) food
supply that will deliver new competitive strengths.
 The development of a framework of institutions and public-
private partnerships to facilitate R&D development and
dissemination.
 The role of industry in the new supply environment –
regrouping, restructuring around new functions that include
issues such as waste management and product
simplification.
 Strategies for waste reduction and a consideration of the
best environmental options for food waste.
 The development of new competition models with a
regenerative rather than extractive emphasis.
 The best options for targeted investment in infrastructure.
Outcomes
 Establishment of a cross-sector consortium.
 A vision statement to guide the development of the UK’s
future food supply.
 A plan for creating and maintaining the necessary UK skills
base.
 A declaration of priorities in domestic land use.
 A description of the EU/UK’s ‘sustainable consumer diet’.
 The development of communication and education
strategies to engage the public on key food issues.
 A plan for increased and selectively targeted public
investment in UK food supply R&D.
 A strategy for knowledge transfer and technological access
for the UK’s agricultural base.
 A strategy to engage the public in the framing of scientific
development within agriculture and food supply.
 The development of standards that extend beyond price,
quality and turnover, to shape a sustainable food supply
system.
 A set of proposals for the specific changes required in
policies, structures, systems and practices across the UK
sectors.
 A programme to ensure that waste-related considerations
are reflected in new policy and regulatory structures.
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Annex A:
‘UK Food Supply in
the 21st Century:
The New Dynamic’:
Research Scope
and Methodology
Research scope
UK food supply chains now rest on complex networks that
span countries and continents. Serving a critical area of the
British public good, their exposure to global trends and
influences is nevertheless increasing all the time with
changes already observable from:
 the impact on global markets of new levels of demand,
particularly from the major emerging economies;
 the effects of climate warming on regions of production
and the implications for trade and international relations;
 inflationary pressures on food pricing;
 the competing demands of food, fuel and feed on land
in the UK and elsewhere;
 the need to conserve energy and reduce damaging
emissions.
This project has been a two-year programme of research
designed to evaluate the effects on the UK’s food supply of
changes in the global dynamic. Focused on the UK’s wheat
and dairy supply systems, the study’s aim has been to deliver
an assessment of the UK’s capacity to respond to the new
challenges. Crucially, it has explored the strategic options
open to each echelon of the wheat and dairy supply systems
as well as the adjustments required in (EU/UK) government
policies and the governance framework under which the
new supply arrangements will be required to operate.
The project has not been concerned with crisis-led
contingency planning. Rather, looking beyond the
planning cycles of most cross-sector organizations, its
effort has been directed to understanding the next genera-
tion’s experience of food demand and supply – the ‘new
normality’. Specific deliverables include:
 a new methodology for evaluating demand and
supply arrangements;
 models of the UK’s future wheat and milk supply
networks;
 outlines of the new practices required in domestic
and overseas (wheat and milk) production;
 maps of the key stakeholder relationships, existing and
future models of alternative governance arrangements.
Research methodology
The overall methodology used in this study combines as its
key principles research, participation – and iteration
between the two (Figure A1). A sustained objective has
been to ensure engagement of the widest range of supply
network opinion at each stage.
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Figure A1: Project process iteration
Scenario development
An important aspect of the project has been the develop-
ment and use of scenarios to identify significant indicators
of the future that are already observable in the present
environment of global demand and supply. Employed as
illustrative rather than predictive tools, the scenarios have
been used both to generate debate and to analyse the
outcomes of exchanges. As explained earlier, they have
been one part of an iterative process that has seen data and
analysis continuously circulating between researchers and
stakeholders from across the supply networks.
The essence of scenario thinking is to anticipate the
spread of future possibilities to help policy-makers and
decision-takers make more informed strategic choices. To
put this in another way, it is more valuable to think
through a range of possible outcomes than to pin every-
thing on a single prediction of what will happen in the
future. Scenario thinking involves asking what could
happen and, having understood that, asking what we
might start doing differently now in order to create new
policy and strategy options.
Scenario development often involves the use of fore-
casting techniques to quantify the future value of
important variables under different assumptions, but it is
important not to treat these forecast values as single-point
predictions of the whole outcome – a move which typically
leads to shallow and misleading strategic reasoning.
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Figure A2: The four scenarios
1. Just a Blip (5 years)
High food prices trigger a strong supply response
by farmers. The weather is favourable. Global
anxieties recede and the oil price falls. The reduced
oil price undercuts the incentive for biofuel produc-
tion, which drops, reducing the competition with
food supply and freeing up production capacity.
Food moves into overproduction and prices fall to
below the long-run trendline as financial specula-
tors change track.
 Economic climate: growth
 Indicative oil price: $65
 Food stocks: rebuilt
 Food prices: fall back
2. Flood Inflation (10 years)
Demand for food grows with population and slightly
outpaces supply, as Asian meat consumption grows
and weather losses mount. High energy prices
support the push for biofuels and raise fertilizer prices.
The push for increased supply encourages investment
in new production technology. Productivity improves
but input costs and food prices remain high. High food
prices fuel inflation and contribute to economic
recession woes.
 Economic climate: stagflation
 Indicative oil price: $90-100
 Food stocks: low
 Food prices: sustained rise
3. Into a New Era (10+ years)
Oil supply tightens as peak oil arrives. Climate change
is stark and weather-related crop losses mount.
International carbon pricing is agreed and environ-
mental regulations get tougher, restricting energy use
and synthetic inputs. Under these conditions, funda-
mental long-term supply constraints become
apparent. The problems of the existing agricultural
paradigm are accepted and production gradually
shifts to an eco-technological approach.
 Economic climate: recovery
 Indicative oil price: $150
 Food stocks: tight
 Food prices: high then falling
4. Food Crisis (5 years)
New diseases spread and water shortages bite.
Geopolitical disruptions drive energy prices to record
levels. Significant input cost pressure drives food
prices higher. Grains stocks are run down in an effort
to avoid high prices. Extreme weather events reduce
harvests well below expectations. Stocks are
exhausted, and prices skyrocket. Nations control
prices and ban exports. Civil disturbances and wars
spread. Serious famines occur in many poor regions.
 Economic climate: recession
 Indicative oil price: $200
 Food stocks: exhausted
 Food prices: very high
The project’s scenario development process began with
45 research interviews conducted with food supply
industry participants and stakeholders throughout 2007.
They were used to collect participants’ perceptions of key
food supply issues and future prospects for the UK’s wheat
and dairy industries. The results were taken as the starting
point for constructing a set of descriptions of the ‘future
situation’. The range of ideas and concerns expressed by
interviewees was then complemented by desk research to
explore and deepen understanding of the various issues
raised. From the combined findings, key drivers were
identified as shaping the present and emerging situation.
The interactions between those drivers were then explored
using systems-thinking principles, and a variety of
potential global situations emerged. Story-lines were
constructed around these ‘future potentials’, turning them
into a set of four global scenarios of food supply.
The scenarios were presented in a series of workshops
with food supply network players and stakeholders in
various parts of the UK. Workshop participants provided
feedback about the plausibility and systemic reasoning of
the scenarios, which were modified to reflect better the
information provided. Workshop participants then used
the scenarios to anticipate the UK situation in each
scenario and to identify appropriate actions by various
parts of the UK food supply network. The workshop
findings were extended by further research into the
dynamics of the UK situation in order to draw a clearer
picture of the implications for government and industry.
The implications are presented in this report as observa-
tions and insights that we hope will contribute to the
process of policy and strategy formulation.
Scenario 1: Just a Blip
High food prices prove to be a temporary blip and soon
return to the long-term trend-line. There is a possibility,
however, that if food prices fall back sharply, financial spec-
ulation in commodities will operate in reverse and lead to
exaggerated food price volatility.
High food prices trigger a major investment in
increased production. Over a two- to three-year period,
marginal land and spare capacity are brought back into
production, double-cropping is more widely adopted and
food production surges. In spite of climate change fears,
the weather proves remarkably favourable. There are
almost no major crop losses affecting feed or food and
sustained rainfall in Australia breaks the long-running
drought, bringing harvests back to normal levels.
Geopolitical stability in oil-producing regions is seen as
improving following the 2008 US election, and oil supply
concerns ease. As a result of receding global fears and a
jump in energy efficiency investment, the oil price returns
to levels around $65 per barrel or below. Food input costs
decline. The reduced oil price undercuts the economic
competitiveness of crop-based biofuels, and ethical
pressure from NGOs builds. Biofuel production falls,
freeing up food production capacity. The combination of a
strong supply response and favourable conditions moves
food into overproduction and prices fall. Financial specu-
lation, which had been a significant factor in driving up
prices, then shifts sharply, causing the food price to plunge
further, ending up well below the previous long-run trend-
line. Farmers reel from the dramatic collapse of food
prices. This paves the way for volatility around the trend-
line in the years that follow.
Scenario 2: Food Inflation
Food prices stay high for a protracted period. They
contribute significantly to inflation, but the economy adapts
and the existing food system copes.
Demand for food continues to grow in step with
increases in world population. Higher meat consumption
in Asia and further bad weather and climate-related crop
losses ensure that demand persistently outpaces produc-
tion growth, albeit by a narrow margin. Oil prices stabilize
at around $90–100 per barrel, high enough to maintain the
push for biofuels, and high gas prices and capacity
constraints keep fertilizer costs high. The imperative to
increase food production leads to widespread deployment
of new technologies; these include a range of bio-technolo-
gies, and methods for improving the efficiency of water
consumption and nitrogen application. Continuing efforts
are made to reduce food waste in the system.
Improvements in practices push up production but come
at a price, with input costs rising overall. Production
struggles to keep pace with demand and global grain
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stocks are not rebuilt. Following the investments in new
food production technology, the widely feared funda-
mental limit to global food production is avoided or at
least delayed. The structure of the global food production
system remains largely unchanged, but the new intensifi-
cation adds to environmental pressures. In Europe, even as
the supply of non-GM crops shrinks worldwide,
consumers continue to resist imports of GM food and
feed. EU policy requires reduced use of fertilizers and
pesticides for environmental reasons, further adding to
feed price pressure by constraining local output.
Persistently high food prices contribute to the woes of a
recession that hits developed countries along with high
energy prices. High food prices add to pressure for wage
increases in emerging markets, where expenditure on food
represents a relatively large percentage of average income;
this translates into higher export prices and contributes to
inflation in developed markets. The world is ultimately
judged to be experiencing a 15-year ‘long-wave’ upswing
in commodity prices. The sustained high food prices,
combined with the difficult economic conditions, cause a
rise in the proportion of personal income spent on food,
ending the previous long-run downward trend.
Scenario 3: Into a New Era
Input prices initially stay high as per capita production falls
steadily. In response, the system of food production is
required to shift dramatically so that increased yields are
delivered efficiently through ‘regenerative’ rather than purely
‘extractive’ uses of resources.
Global oil production stays flat and begins to tighten.
The view spreads that ‘peak oil’ has arrived. The oil price
rises above $150 per barrel but is held in check by reduc-
tions in energy consumption and the widespread deploy-
ment of energy efficiency technologies. Oil prices
sustained at a high level support a continuing emphasis on
biofuel production. The effects of climate change become
starkly obvious, with weather-related losses reaching
higher levels every year. Developed countries agree on
carbon pricing, and developing countries sign up over
time. Many countries introduce water pricing in response
to serious drought conditions. Tougher environmental
limits on pesticides and fertilizers are introduced, and
nitrogen pricing is debated. Food production per person is
in decline, food shortages are more frequent and prices are
climbing. Under these conditions, it becomes clear that
food production is hitting fundamental long-term
constraints. The media refer to this as ‘peak food.’ Social
values and preferences shift decisively towards what are
broadly viewed as ‘sustainable’ methods, and wherever
there are affluent consumers, the demand for local,
seasonal, increasingly vegetarian, fairly traded and organic
food continues to rise. At the same time, high food prices
permit investment in new agricultural technologies aimed
at increasing production while addressing environmental
issues – soil degradation, water contamination, pest resist-
ance, biodiversity loss and greenhouse gas emissions. Over
a period of 10 years and beyond, a new eco-technological
production approach emerges that includes: crop rotation,
cover cropping, agro-forestry, ‘green’ fertilizers derived
from agricultural and food waste, new varieties (that have
resilient, pest-resistant, nitrogen-fixing qualities), more
efficient use of inputs through advanced information tech-
nology, and reduced water use. The new approach has a
smaller environmental footprint, fewer synthetic inputs,
better health outcomes, and higher yields. It starts in
pockets, co-existing with the old approach, and gradually
takes hold as more farmers adopt the new methods. The
old approach gives way and the international food
industry and trading rules gradually restructure around
the new production paradigm, lifting the environmental
and production constraints of the old system. Per capita
food production rises as the new approach spreads and
food prices finally begin to fall.
Scenario 4: Food in Crisis
Multiple shocks disrupt food production and supply. Prices
skyrocket as stocks plummet, triggering food shortages,
famine and civil panic.
Two serious global disturbances hit agriculture in short
order: the rapid spread of crop/animal disease, and sharply
worsening water shortages. These come on top of new
geopolitical disruptions that affect energy supply. There
are also continuing problems in financial markets. The oil
price surges to record levels, well above $200. The increase
puts significant pressure on food input costs, and food
prices are driven even higher by financial speculation.
Very high gas prices discourage inorganic fertilizer use,
further tightening the food and feed supply situation.
Grain stocks are run down to new lows around the world
in an effort to sidestep high prices, merely delaying the
unavoidable impact of contracting supply. A succession of
extreme weather events then reduces world harvests to
well below the already lowered levels, and stocks are not
rebuilt. Prices skyrocket as the true supply situation
becomes apparent. Sudden and extreme food price rises
prompt many more governments to introduce price
controls, subsidies and export bans which further worsen
the overall supply situation. Farmers are penalized by not
being allowed to benefit from the high prices and food is
taken off the world market. Other countries, particularly
China, scramble to tie up bilateral food supply deals. In
many parts of the world farming is seriously disrupted,
further exacerbating the overall supply position. Serious
food shortages develop which cause universal public shock
and growing political panic. Severe famines, for which no
food aid is available, occur in the poorest and least resilient
regions. The shortages trigger serious civil disruptions and
outbreaks of conflict. Directly and indirectly the food
shortfalls cause millions of deaths, mostly in the devel-
oping world. There is turmoil in the food industry, with
some firms making vast windfall profits and others going
to the wall. New policies enacted on an emergency basis
have their own unintended consequences. A completely
untested set of supply arrangements is forged in crisis
mode. The struggle, even in the developed world, is to
keep people fed, disregarding where necessary any ideas of
consumer choice.
www.chathamhouse.org.uk
48
Food Futures
Annex B:
Research Team
Biographies
With specialist scientific and technological, economic and
additional consumer-related expertise co-opted as
required, a core research team was assembled that repre-
sented excellence in each of the relevant fields:
Cardiff Business School
(Kate Bailey, David Simons, Alexandra Kiff): supply chain
lean thinking/elimination of waste, supply chain design
and sustainable development, performance measures,
cross-supply chain collaboration, the use of information
flows in business environments.
Kate Bailey is a Senior Research Associate within the Food
Process Innovation Unit at Cardiff Business School. She
has a background in supply chain and production manage-
ment, having worked for major international companies
within the electronics and automotive industries. She
joined the Business School in 2004, and has since led a
number of Value Chain Analysis (VCA) projects across the
dairy, red meat, cereals and fresh produce sectors. She led
the research team and coordinated the programme for the
food supply project convened by Chatham House. She
continues to work in the field of food supply, with partic-
ular focus on supply chain vulnerability, food supply
networks and cross-chain collaboration.
After graduating as a Mechanical Engineer,David Simons
completed an MSc in Management Science & Operational
Research at Warwick University Business School and spent
six years in Operations and Logistics consultancy. At
Cardiff Business School, he has ten years’ experience of
supply chain analysis and implementation in the automo-
tive and food sectors. With Dan Jones he facilitated lean
thinking at Tesco from 1996 to 2002 and more recently has
been principal investigator for a £3m research programme
covering the four main agri-food sectors in the UK; red
meat, cereals, dairy and horticulture. He is currently Co-
Director of Cardiff Business School’s Food Process
Innovation Unit.
Alexandra Kiff graduated from the University of York in
2006 with a BA in Economics and Economic History.
During her degree course her chosen areas of study
included the globalization of production, the economic
growth of developing nations, and the complexities of the
international economy. Her current research interests
include the impact of global changes on supply chains and
future changes to UK food supply.
Centre for Business Relationships, Accountability,
Sustainability and Society (BRASS, Cardiff University)
(Professor Terry Marsden, Professor Robert Lee): analysis of
business relationships to promote sustainability, accounta-
bility and social responsibility. The interaction between
businesses and their social and physical environment.
Accountability across the food supply chain.
Professor Terry Marsden is the Head of Cardiff
University’s Department of City and Regional Planning
and holds the Chair of Environmental Policy and
Planning. He is the Co-Director of BRASS. Terry is a
member of the Royal Town Planning Institute and co-
editor of the Journal of Environmental Policy and Planning.
His specialist areas of research include the agri-food
debate and environmental policy.
Professor Robert Lee is a Co-Director of BRASS. An envi-
ronmental lawyer, he is a widely acknowledged expert on
contaminated land and waste management. He is currently
working on a book on food regulation in Europe. He
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continues to have an active interest in legal practice, being
employed as a professional development consultant with
the Environment, Planning and Regulation Group of
Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer.
City University
(Professor Tim Lang): food policy analysis, human and
environmental health issues as they relate to social justice
and culture.
Tim Lang is Professor of Food Policy at City University’s
Centre for Food Policy in London. His special interest is
on tensions between state, supply chain and civil society
policies, and how they shape (and respond to) competing
demands about public health, environment, social justice
and consumer rights. Most recently he and colleagues have
completed a two-year EU 6th framework study of ethical
traceability in the food chain.
In 2005-06, Tim chaired the Scottish NHS Executive’s
Scottish Diet Action Plan Review and, from 2005 to 2007,
was an advisor to the Foresight Obesity programme. He is
a Vice President of the Chartered Institute of
Environmental Health and a Fellow of the Faculty of
Public Health of the Royal College of Physicians.
Oxford University
Saïd Business School (Hardin Tibbs): scenario thinking to
frame strategic concerns and global issues, the facilitation
of debate, and analysis of the future effects of change and
their strategic implications.
Hardin Tibbs is a management consultant with extensive
international experience. He is an Associate Fellow at the
Saïd Business School, Oxford University, where he co-
teaches the executive education Scenarios Programme,
and has a research role at the James Martin Institute for
Science and Civilization, also at Oxford. An experienced
scenario planner, he is CEO of Synthesys Strategic
Consulting Ltd., and specializes in futures research and
strategy development. He has been based at various times
in the US, Australia and Europe, where his work has
spanned a wide range of industries and issues, including
food, bio-technology, natural resources, taxation and
transport. In addition to his strategy work, Hardin has
made significant contributions on issues involving tech-
nology and environment. He is also a Fellow of the RSA.
Chatham House
(Susan Ambler-Edwards, Project Leader): the link to
expertise around the world on the analysis of international
issues.
Susan Ambler-Edwards is a member of the Senior Civil
Service whose career has been built on successive
appointments in the central policy and operations staffs
of the Ministry of Defence. Her areas of expertise include
resilience of the civil infrastructure. Susan was seconded
to Chatham House in January 2005 and led the food
project from June of that year to December 2008. She
holds an MA in International Studies from King’s
College, London.
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